More than three months have passed since the parliamentary elections, following a year of unofficial campaigning. Throughout this period, political life in Kosovo has revolved almost entirely around the elections, sidelining both domestic development and foreign policy. Now, caught in a self-destructive cycle, political parties are locked in a blame game over the election of the Speaker of the Kosovo Assembly. This manufactured crisis conceals a deeper unwillingness to form coalitions and engage with the state-building agenda.

So far, we’ve witnessed eighteen failed attempts to elect the Speaker of the Kosovo Assembly — a political circus that has normalized entirely unnecessary blockades. This crisis has been deliberately manufactured at a stage of institution-building, where no clear legal or constitutional deadlines exist, allowing political actors to operate in a “gray zone.” While this may carry no direct consequences for their parties, it has serious implications for the functioning of the state.

This deadlock is not one-sided. The crisis is being fueled both by the election-winning party, Vetëvendosje (VV), which is responsible for forming institutions and is promoting an “all against us” narrative, and by the largest former opposition parties — LDK, PDK and AAK. The opposition is artificially presenting itself as a united bloc in the eyes of the public. In reality, however, it does not represent a cohesive front, despite its shared history in governance.

The most troubling aspect of this political deadlock and the delay in forming institutions is that it does not stem from a genuine need for policy coordination. Instead, it is the product of an outdated policymaking mindset rooted in bargaining and numerical calculations within the Kosovo Assembly. This is happening at a time when Kosovo urgently needs political consensus and direction, both domestically and internationally.

It has become clear that the political culture in the country — especially around elections and coalition-building — has never developed or matured enough to prioritize governing programs or the ideological profiling of parties. Instead, the political scene has been dominated by power-sharing deals and position-based negotiations, often driven by individual interests. This has led to a form of state capture and a country adrift, without clear political direction, where power is simply divided among a few parties.

Kosovo and its citizens are paying a high price for the political class’s refusal to recognize the necessity of compromise in a multi-party system, which is designed precisely to function through cooperation and consensus between parties. No party can govern alone, and this is not a flaw but a feature that safeguards democracy. The system is built to prevent domination and to promote compromise. But compromise requires political culture — and leaders who understand that power is not an end in itself.

Even more worrying is that this approach is being reinforced by public opinion itself — including the voices of elites, civil society and the media — who focus not on the content of a government program, but on questions such as: “Who has the numbers?,” “Who will become the speaker of the Kosovo Assembly?” or “Who can be prime minister or president?” This further fuels a dangerous reality in which power, not substance, becomes the only thing that matters. It contributes to the normalization of a political culture that places individuals at the center — exemplified by the absurd insistence on a candidate for the speaker who is widely known to lack the necessary votes, not to resolve the crisis, but to prolong it.

This is not merely a political crisis; it is a crisis of a political model that remains unchallenged. The sole objective appears to be securing an electoral outcome that enables “free-hand” governance — a model that more closely resembles autocracy than a pluralistic system with robust checks.

The state on autopilot on the eve of the local election campaign

On March 15, the Central Election Commission announced the final results of the February 9 elections. From that moment, it was clear that no single party had secured a majority to govern alone. One of the foreseeable scenarios — and arguably the most expected, though least desirable — was deliberate procrastination and political deadlock. This outcome has materialized, as forming a government with the minimum required majority of 61 votes is widely viewed by political parties as an unsustainable solution. Such a government would likely lack both the durability and the political strength needed to navigate sensitive processes, such as the election of the president.

Although the president’s term ends in March 2026, political parties are already looking beyond a governing agreement and making calculations. In the language of political negotiations, the presidency is treated as a key bargaining chip. As a result, parties show little or no real interest in forming institutions, because a failed presidential election would automatically trigger new elections in 2026 — a scenario that directly affects their political and electoral interests. Their primary focus, therefore, is on March 2026 and managing the numbers needed to elect the next president.

Therefore, much like the Bulgarian scenario, where the country has operated under technical or interim governments for extended periods, Kosovo now risks spending more than a year without stable governance. This issue will likely determine the balance of power on the political scene for years to come.

As if the central-level crisis weren’t enough, political parties have already launched their campaigns for local elections, expected to take place at the end of the year. This further undermines the willingness to compromise or resolve the national deadlock, as any move toward resolution could be politically unpopular — clashing with party egos and the narratives they have presented to their electorates.

Local elections — which should focus on concrete issues such as urban planning, local services, budgeting, waste management and public transport — risk sidelining these priorities. This is due to a proposal, currently being floated sporadically in public, to hold parliamentary elections alongside local elections at the end of the year. Such a scenario benefits political parties eager to claim victory in local contests while completely ignoring meaningful local debates, the concrete needs of citizens and the real challenges faced by municipalities.

Those advocating for the merging of the two electoral processes must recognize the harmful and long-term consequences this would have on local democracy. Since the decentralization process began in 2008, the municipal level in Kosovo has gained a significant degree of autonomy and plays a crucial role in delivering public services and strengthening democratic governance at the local level. This proximity to citizens and the influence of local government have, for many parties with a transactional approach, turned municipalities into instruments for maintaining their electoral base through clientelistic networks. In recent years, increasingly strained relations between central and local authorities — exacerbated by deep political polarization — have hindered the effective functioning of many municipalities. As a result, political parties have shifted their focus away from dividing responsibilities toward seeking maximum control over both levels of governance. This time, by attempting to merge and instrumentalize electoral processes for narrow party gains.

In this context, public opinion, experts, the media and civil society must exert pressure to ensure that these two electoral processes remain separate. Local elections are not a platform for high-stakes political competition; they are essential mechanisms for ensuring citizens’ well-being over the next four years and for safeguarding the functional independence of municipalities. Holding local and parliamentary elections simultaneously not only undermines the legitimacy and significance of the local vote, but also violates a fundamental principle of democracy: the separation of powers and political agendas according to the level of responsibility. Local elections should be about citizens, municipalities and everyday problems — not about grand power calculations at the central level.

Political crisis: Foreign policy failure undermines the state from within

Kosovo is facing a period of deep stagnation, marked by a deteriorating foreign policy. The setbacks on the international stage are no longer merely matters of image — they are directly impacting the country’s ability to govern effectively, implement reforms and advance in the European integration process.

Meanwhile, basic state functions remain blocked.

Kosovo remains the only country in the region under punitive measures by the EU. In any other country, this would trigger a political alarm. In Kosovo, silence prevails. There is no action plan to lift the measures — only ongoing complaints to the EU, which, although possibly legitimate, are not enough to move things forward. A naïve hope still persists: that Serbia might make a misstep in its relations with the EU, allowing Kosovo to benefit as the more “trusted” partner. But this is not a strategy — it is harmful passivity and a form of surrender.

Although under EU sanctions, Kosovo has been granted access to the EU Growth Plan, receiving equal treatment alongside other countries in the region. However, due to the lack of a functioning parliament and a highly irresponsible political elite, the EU Growth Plan has not been ratified — leaving these vital funds for the country blocked. This is occurring at a time when U.S. financial assistance is suspended, and development support is shrinking dramatically.

Another recent and significant foreign policy failure is Kosovo’s missed opportunity to advance its membership in the Council of Europe. Kosovo was excluded from the 2025 agenda not because the door was closed, but because domestic leaders were preoccupied with internal political maneuvering. This failure is not a mere incident — it is a symptom of a deeper problem: a lack of vision, a lack of a unified state agenda and a lack of political maturity. The blame cannot be placed on the Council of Europe, external actors or even the absence of stronger support from allies. The responsibility lies squarely with Kosovo’s institutions, which have shown little meaningful engagement with Brussels or the capitals of key international partners.

Foreign policy failures are no longer isolated from domestic realities. They are reflected in declining public trust, weakened institutional functionality and the loss of concrete opportunities for development and integration. Kosovo is paying a high price for its lack of vision, political shortsightedness and strategic indifference. Without a serious political turnaround, the country risks not only internal deterioration but also being completely sidelined on the international stage.

State-building agenda abandoned by political elite

Although Kosovo has experienced political crises in the past, the current blockade is different. It is deeper, more cynical and carries more damaging consequences — not only for domestic governance, but also for the country’s international standing and long-term future. This is unfolding in a significantly changed global context, where Kosovo no longer holds the priority it once did on the international agenda.

One of the most worrying aspects of this crisis is the clear exposure not only of a lack of political culture and maturity, but also of a fading ambition for state-building — an agenda that once formed the core of policymaking in the country and was strongly supported by the international community. But the era when the international community provided agendas and solutions for every political issue in Kosovo is over — and rightly so. By now, Kosovo should have reached a sufficient level of political maturity to lead the fundamental processes of a multi-party democratic system and to take full responsibility for its own state-building and reform agenda.

However, the more restrained stance of the international community — often criticized in the past for interfering in domestic affairs — has exposed a dangerous gap: the absence of a decision-making elite that not only understands the importance of state-building but is also capable and willing to lead it, both internally and externally.

This situation underscores a bitter truth. In the absence of external pressure and a clear internal direction, the very idea of statehood has been pushed to the margins. As such, the criticism that the political elite directs at the international community for a perceived lack of support or for “abandoning” Kosovo should instead be turned inward. It appears that we abandoned the state-building process long before we were willing to admit it.

Feature Image: K2.0

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