The contested legitimacy of non-Serb mayors

The arrival of non-Serb mayors at the helm of these four municipalities was preceded by a chain of events that began in June 2022, when the Kosovo government implemented reciprocity measures requiring the re-registration of license plates issued by Serbia and the non-recognition of identification documents issued by Serbia within Kosovo’s territory.

These decisions triggered immediate reactions in the north, followed by the erection of barricades in Jarinje and Bërnjak, as well as sporadic clashes that culminated at the end of 2022 with the mass resignation of Serbs from central institutions, municipalities, the police and the judiciary. These resignations were instigated and coordinated by Srpska Lista, the dominant political force of Kosovo Serbs, which enjoys direct backing from the Serbian government. Through this move, Srpska Lista aimed to demonstrate that without its involvement, no institutional process in the north could operate effectively.

The resignation of Serb mayors in these municipalities paved the way for extraordinary elections in April 2023, which were boycotted by Srpska Lista and almost entirely by the Serb community: only 3.5% of about 45,000 registered voters cast their ballots. The boycott, led by Srpska Lista and publicly supported by the Serbian government, sought to delegitimize the electoral process and reject any form of political representation outside its structures.

As a result, in municipalities where Serbs make up the overwhelming majority, non-Serb mayors were elected — creating a deep disconnect between demographic reality and political outcome. When the newly elected mayors entered municipal buildings in May 2023, assisted by the Kosovo Police and KFOR, violent protests erupted, drawing harsh international reactions and calls for immediate de-escalation and for new inclusive elections. Furthermore, the European Union (EU) imposed punitive measures against Kosovo, including the suspension of funds, in response to what it described as a lack of cooperation by the Kosovo government in reducing tensions in the north. A year later, in April 2024, a referendum was held on the dismissal of the non-Serb mayors, but it also failed due to yet another boycott led by Srpska Lista.

Thus, the non-Serb mayors continued to perform their duties, legally confirmed, but lacking political legitimacy in the eyes of the Serb majority population.

Since then, tensions in these municipalities have been frequent, culminating in the armed attack on the Kosovo Police in Banjska in September 2023 by a group led by Milan Radoičić, former vice-president of Srpska Lista, in which one Albanian police officer and three Serb attackers were killed.

The fact that non-Serb mayors in the north are not perceived as representing the political will of local Serbs — within the broader history of institutional boycott, but also beyond Srpska Lista — has been clearly expressed through public episodes of opposition against them.

The mayor of North Mitrovica, Erden Atiq, who is often seen moving around the city’s public spaces, has, more than anyone else, been the target of such reactions. An incident in August of this year, during the “Mitrovica Jazz Days” festival, best illustrates this tension. The organizers had moved the festival from South Mitrovica to North Mitrovica’s promenade in an attempt to build bridges between communities through culture. But the moment Atiq appeared near the stage, dozens of Serb citizens began whistling and hurling insults at him. The Kosovo Police arrested two young men, sparking tensions between police officers and the gathered crowd. One was accused of verbal insults, while the other was held in custody on suspicion of issuing threats.

In recent months, dissatisfaction with the mayors has only deepened. Since August, municipal institutions in the north have launched a campaign to erase Serbian murals and symbols — a process that culminated with the replacement of the “Kosovska Mitrovica” inscription.

Many of these murals had remained on city’s walls for years, becoming part of the symbolic landscape of the Serbian community. The campaign has been seen by some residents as an effort to erase elements of Serb identity from public spaces. Such actions have also been criticized by Serb political representatives in the north, who described them as provocative and politically motivated.

In some cases, the erased murals openly glorified war crimes and the Serbian nationalist ideology of the 1990s, an example is one mural dedicated to Ratko Mladić, responsible for the genocide in Srebrenica. For non-Serb citizens, other murals, which evoke memories of oppression by the Serbian state, represent key identity markers for Serbs — such as those dedicated to Patriarch Pavle and Metropolitan Amfilohije. The former, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church during the 1990s, preached peace but never clearly distanced himself from the nationalist currents of the time. The latter, a powerful cleric in Montenegro and one of the most influential figures in the Serbian Orthodox Church, was an open supporter of the “Greater Serbia” ideology and the nationalist wars of the 1990s. Yet, for Serbs, both remain important spiritual and symbolic figures, which is why the removal of these murals is perceived as an attack on Serbian Orthodox identity, and a deliberate attempt to erase Serbian cultural symbols that hold weight in their collective memory, 

Before this campaign began, no public debate had taken place on the representation of symbols in public space, nor on the criteria that would determine their inclusion or exclusion. In some cases, municipal institutions even removed murals that were not inherently inflammatory. One example was the mural dedicated to the “Golden Dolphins,” Serbia’s national water polo team, which won the Olympic gold medal in Rio in 2016.

The local elections thus find Serbs in the north feeling more threatened and less represented, even by Kosovo’s central institutions.

Because the north has remained outside the effective control of Kosovo’s institutions, over the years, the area has become fertile ground for the activities of armed groups and criminal networks. Since 2021, Prime Minister Kurti’s government has made extending sovereignty to this part of the country, one of its top priorities, through the strengthening law and order — a process marked by frequent raids and police operations.

The Kosovo government has also shut down most of the parallel Serbian institutions that had been financed by the Serbian government (with the exception of the education and healthcare systems), while also banning the use of the Serbian dinar.

These actions have been accompanied by frequent protests from local Serb residents, who do not view the closure of these structures as a strengthening of law and order or institutional normalization, but rather as a threat to their security and well-being. For them, the parallel structures were not perceived as illegal, but as the only institutions that effectively functioned — providing salaries, social services, education and healthcare.

Their importance was not diminished even after the 2013 Brussels Agreement, which aimed to include and integrate Serbs into Kosovo’s state institutions, such as the police, judiciary and local administration. More recently, however, the opening of offices representing Kosovo state institutions — including a branch of Kosovo Post and several businesses owned by Albanians — has not been well received and is being boycotted by local Serbs.

One of the factors that has deepened mistrust of the Kosovo government within the Serb community and heightened their sense of insecurity is the increased presence of the Kosovo Police, particularly Special Units, over the past two years. According to reports from civil society organizations operating in the north, the number of citizen complaints about excessive use of force by police units has risen. In several cases, local media have broadcast footage of young Serbs being arrested — events that have sparked strong public reactions.

Srpska Lista and the strategy of return

In the absence of institutional representation for Serbs, and amid dissatisfaction with the centralized, non-dialogue approach through which Kosovo has sought to extend its sovereignty, new political narratives have emerged in the north. While all Serb parties have built their campaigns on this context, Srpska Lista has used it to deflect responsibility for its own political choices. For more than a decade, it has been the dominant force in local governance in the north, known for exerting pressure and intimidation on Serbs, as well as for orchestrating its own withdrawal from institutions.

In reality, Srpska Lista’s campaign offers no concrete vision for improving citizens’ daily lives in the north, focusing instead almost entirely on harsh rhetoric against the Kosovo government and on restoring Serbian symbols and institutions.

An election rally in Zubin Potok on October 1 best illustrated the party’s prevailing discourse. During the rally, the list leader and former mayor, Srđan Vulović, publicly admitted that Srpska Lista had made a mistake by withdrawing from Kosovo’s institutions in 2022.

“A living man makes mistakes,” he told supporters. “But now it is time to correct them,” referring to the party’s decision to participate in the October elections. According to Vulović, the decision to abandon the institutions during the 2022 license plate crisis left the Serb community “without jobs, without an economy and without influence.” He also accused the international community of failing to provide support.

His statement marked a rare admission of error, since the party had previously justified the boycott as a form of political resistance against Kosovo’s institutions. In addition to the October local elections, Srpska Lista also returned to the Kosovo Assembly in the parliamentary elections held in February of this year.

In the same speech, Vulović accused acting Prime Minister Kurti and Vetëvendosje (LVV) of “attempting to expel the Serb people,” calling participation in the elections “a new Serbian uprising.” He urged citizens to “win with the pen” and to “end the terror” of the current Albanian-led administration in the north.

The party’s president, Zlatan Elek, echoed the same message, accusing Kurti of trying to dismantle Srpska Lista because of its close ties with Belgrade and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. “The winner is already known – Srpska Lista,” he declared, framing the race as a struggle for the political and cultural survival of Serbs in Kosovo.

In Zubin Potok, the party’s candidate for mayor, Miloš Perović, called on residents to “liberate the municipality” from “fake and imposed mayors,” while other speakers emphasized dignity, unity, and resistance against the authorities in Prishtina.

The tone of the rallies clearly outlines Srpska Lista’s new strategy: acknowledging past mistakes and returning to institutions through the ballot box, positioning itself as the sole legitimate representative of Serbs in Kosovo. Meanwhile, Belgrade has openly supported this return. Serbian President Vučić has promised the creation of 400 new jobs in the health sector for Serbs in Kosovo, a move widely seen as part of a coordinated campaign to encourage voter turnout and reinforce loyalty to Srpska Lista.

Against Srpska Lista and Belgrade

In northern Kosovo, opposition candidates to Srpska Lista frame this election as a confrontation with the party’s political monopoly and its long-standing loyalty to Belgrade. They present the October 12 vote as an opportunity to break away from that control and return decision-making power to the local level after more than a decade of one-party dominance. Despite their differences, their message is the same: a pledge to end the politics of intimidation and patronage, and to put power back into the hands of local citizens.

Aleksandar Arsenijević, the Democratic Serbian Party (Srpska Demokratija) candidate for mayor of North Mitrovica, portrays himself as a victim of “political expulsion” by Kosovo’s institutions. Arsenijević is currently outside Kosovo, facing charges of illegal weapons possession. Speaking to northern media outlets such as Alternativna and Kontakt Plus from an improvised camp near the Jarinje border crossing, he claimed the weapons found on a property linked to him were planted to silence him. He promised to return if elected mayor and accused both Srpska Lista and Nenad Rašić’s party of vote-buying.

Vladimir Radosavljević, the Democratic Party of Serbia’s candidate for mayor of Leposavic, describes Srpska Lista as “a machine of persuasion and privilege.” According to him, millions of euros from programs financed by Serbia have circulated within a narrow circle of politically connected people.

Speaking about the biggest problems facing the citizens of Leposavic, Radosavljević says that ordinary families are barely surviving.

“For five months in the summer we have no water, in the winter we have no electricity. We live among garbage, without cultural life and without events for young people. Young people are leaving, unemployment is high and many families live in poverty,” he said.

Milija Biševac, the Serbian People’s Movement (Srpski Narodni Pokret) candidate for mayor of Zubin Potok, was even harsher. He argued that Srpska Lista “no longer stands alongside the people,” accusing its officials of facing daily pressures, including threats to jobs, social benefits and public contracts. According to him, the 2022 decision to withdraw from Kosovo’s institutions was “a self-inflicted wound” that left local communities “without a state, without salaries and without functioning schools.”

Meanwhile, Ivan Vučković, journalist and leader of the civic initiative “Roots” (Koreni), was even more blunt: “They had twelve years. Everything they touched, they ruined.” Nebojša Milić of New Face – People’s Justice (Novo Lice – Narodna Pravda) presented his list as the only truly independent alternative, stressing that its members “are not paid by Serbia” and that some candidates have even faced threats to withdraw from the race.

For the northern opposition parties, distancing themselves from Srpska Lista does not mean aligning politically with Kosovo’s institutions. The same candidates who criticize Belgrade’s influence are equally skeptical of the way Kosovo’s institutions are exercising sovereignty in the north, insisting they do not want to be the tools of either side.

Their main argument is that Kosovo’s sovereignty in the north has been imposed by force, not built on trust. According to them, governance currently functions according to a model in which decisions are made for the north, but not with the north.

“We are neither Kurti’s Serbs nor Vučić’s Serbs. We are an option that wants to deal with the local problems of all citizens,” Vučković said.

“Prishtina must understand that it needs to talk to local Serbs. We are residents of this place, who have lived here for centuries; we are not foreigners,” said Biševac, referring to the need for Kosovo’s government to open dialogue with the local Serb community.

According to these candidates, the increased police presence, frequent raids and removal of Serbian symbols have brought not integration but anxiety and exclusion. Instead of feeling part of the institutions, many citizens see them as instruments of control rather than service.

These parties are not calling for a continuation of the boycott but for a return of institutions through their proper functioning. Their campaigns are pragmatic and local, with emphasis on legality, transparency and the provision of public services. Candidates stress the need to reopen municipal counters and administrative services for citizens.

“Open doors, not checkpoints,” said Marko Jakšić, leader of the civic initiative “North for All” (Sever za sve), in an interview with Alternativna and Kontakt Plus.

Jakšić, from North Mitrovica, speaks of a program called “City of the Future,” which aims to modernize waste management, create youth employment and revive cultural life. In Zubin Potok, Biševac calls for “rebuilding from scratch,” focusing on the restoration of schools, the water supply network and frozen public-sector salaries dating back to 2022.

These parties are also demanding a suspension and review of new administrative measures, a more predictable police presence and structured dialogue in which elected Serb mayors would negotiate directly with Kosovo’s ministries — not solely through Belgrade.