In June 2022, Kosovo’s government began a new policy of replacing Serbian-issued identification documents for anyone entering Kosovo with a temporary declaration form — a procedure Serbia has been applying for Kosovo citizens since 2011. It also ordered that all vehicles with Serbian-issued license plates in Kosovo register with Kosovar plates. This stirred things up in Brussels. After a long meeting between Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić in November 2022, Kurti refused to accept an EU proposal to resolve the issue of license plates and accused Borrell of giving up on the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Eventually, the decision was accepted, leaving room for new tensions. 

This was not the only thing going on in November 2022. The suspension of Nenad Đurić, regional director of the Kosovo Police in the north, for refusing to implement the decision on license plates resulted in a mass resignation of Kosovo Serbs from public institutions. This included mayoral roles in North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavić and Zvečan. The elections to fill these positions, held on April 23, 2023, were largely boycotted by both Serb candidates and voters. This caused the overall turnout to be just 3% of all the voters and led to the victory of four candidates from Albanian majority parties. The election’s outcome incited protests in the four municipalities.

In this context, Lajčak and Borrell held separate meetings with Vučić and Kurti, but made no progress towards a sustainable solution. This prompted criticism by Kosovo’s delegation, with Kurti saying that Lajčak has a clear position against Kosovo. “Here we are dealing with an emissary who has distorted the process,” said Kurti, after a meeting, adding that he would register his displeasure with Italian Prime Minister Meloni, German Chancellor Scholz, French President Macron and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. 

The issue of forming the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM), which has resurfaced as a frequently debated issue, is another example of a topic discussed in the dialogue remaining stagnant. The EU foresaw the implementation of the ASM within the Agreement on the path to normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. Although neither Kurti nor Vučić signed that agreement, Borrell presented it as approved based on his word alone and framed it as an important step in the dialogue. One year later, the ASM has still not been implemented and remains a contentious issue between Kurti, the EU, and key EU states. 

The lack of progress in the dialogue and the growing perception that the EU is appeasing Vučić and exerting undue pressure on Kosovo to make concessions has led MEPs to question Lajčak’s credibility and the EU’s efficacy in the dialogue. Several MEPs voiced their concerns particularly in a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) on June 22, 2023. The EU had announced measures against Kosovo earlier that month. 

In the AFET meeting, MEP Michael Gahler from the EPP criticized Lajčak for siding with Serbia and not publicly criticizing Vučić. “Kosovo is looking for honest brokers that do not appease the Serb President and pressure the victim,” said Gahler.

Moreover, Tonino Picula from S&D listed a set of questions about whether there will be negative measures against Serbia and about Russian influence in Serbia. Picula’ fellow S&D member, Thijs Reuten, asked for a stronger and moral stance from the EU, calling Vučić an autocrat and criticizing EU’s representatives for an unbalanced view. “It was not even the terrible bothsideism,” said Picula. 

RE’s Ilan Kuychyuk expressed additional concern about whether the EU’s approach would have a spillover effect on Kosovo’s citizens. 

Greens MEP Thomas Waitz also called out the EU’s approach, saying that the EU made a bad impression defending the perpetrators and attacking the victims of the aggression, something that Waitz saw as undermining the EU’s credibility in the whole region. Another Greens MEP, Romeo Franz, also called for an end to the appeasement of Vučić, saying that he believes EU mediation has fully failed. 

MEPs’ criticism of Borrell and Lajčak’s strategy in the dialogue increased after the September 2023 terror attack in Banjska, in northern Kosovo, in which Kosovo Police sergeant Afrim Bunjaku was killed. S&D, RE, ECR, EPP and the Greens joined together in a resolution that condemned the attack and labeled its perpetrators “terrorists.” The resolution also called on Serbia to refrain from its repetitive pattern of escalation. Though the resolution was not legally binding, it urged Borrell and Lajčak to be more proactive in facilitating the dialogue. It also called on the EU to update its overall approach to Kosovo and Serbia normalization.

In April 2024, Borrell nominated Lajčak to become EU ambassador to Switzerland. It is unknown who will replace Lajčak as EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue. Whoever takes the post — former President of Slovenia Borut Pahor has been mentioned as a potential candidate — will find the dialogue stagnant and will have significant work to do given the stasis and frustration that Lajčak’s approach of exerting more pressure on Kosovo has brought.

Moreover, von der Leyen’s EPP released a draft manifesto earlier in 2024, arguing that the next EC should create a separate defense commissioner post and transform the high representative job currently held by Borrell into an “EU foreign minister” who would allow the EU to react to international crises faster. 

Whether these crises are expected to arise in the Western Balkans or elsewhere, whoever the EP approves as Borrell’s replacement, along with the new special representative, will have their work cut out for them. They will have to devise a new approach to facilitating the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and ensuring that the EU is seen as a driver of reform and positive change in the Western Balkans and beyond, particularly if far-right voices hostile to Kosovo such as Le Pen’s National Rally gain more prominence at the EP level.