In February 2021, Vetëvendosje (VV) won the parliamentary elections with a historic 50.2% of the vote — an unprecedented result in the history of elections in Kosovo since its declaration of independence. Centered on justice and employment, their electoral platform promised sweeping reforms, including a vetting process in the justice and security sectors, job creation and an uncompromising fight against corruption.

This strong support for VV was largely a reaction to two decades of misrule by previous governments, as well as a popular endorsement of the party’s promise to offer a different model of governance. Four years into its mandate however, the concrete results have not fully met the initial promises or matched the expectations for substantial change.

Despite the lack of significant improvement in daily life, support for VV and the leader and acting prime minister, Albin Kurti, has remained stable. In the elections held on February 9, VV once again received the majority of the vote with 42%. Although this marks a drop of eight percentage points, it still represents an unusually strong result in comparison to the standards of political parties in Kosovo.

This persistent support is closely tied to the public perception that VV remains one of the least corrupt parties in the country. Additionally, the diaspora continues to play an important role, often viewing VV as the only viable alternative for real change in Kosovo. Some government measures, such as occasional payments of 100 euros to families in need, assistance to pensioners and students and the government’s approach toward the northern region, have been viewed positively by parts of the population.

Thus, the performance of the Kurti II government from March 2021 to March 2025 is assessed not only through numbers and statistics but also through public perception, which continues to offer considerable support despite various challenges and a lack of significant progress in key areas. However the essential question remains, are the citizens of Kosovo living better after these four years? Answering this question requires concrete data that reflects the everyday economic realities of the population.

Beyond perceptions, into the data

Is the economic situation of citizens better today? The Kurti II government assumed office at a fragile moment immediately after the COVID-19 pandemic but it also benefited from a favorable global climate for economic recovery in the post-2021 period. This resulted in a sharp rebound, with economic growth reaching 10.75% — driven more by the reopening after the pandemic than by any sustainable development model. In the following years, growth stabilized at a more typical level, averaging around 4.2% during the 2022–2024 period.

But beyond these macroeconomic figures, concrete indicators of well-being, such as average wages, inflation and food spending, paint a more complex picture for the average citizen.

Although the average net wage rose steadily from 416 euros in 2020 to 506 euros in 2023, this nominal increase did not translate into a real improvement in living standards. Citizens faced high inflation, which peaked in 2022 with double-digit growth, severely eroding purchasing power, especially for essential goods.

In February 2024, the UN Development Programme published concerning data on the impact of inflation on household economies. In 2021, around 48% of households spent 200 euros or more per month on food; by 2023, that percentage had risen to 59.5%.

The sharp rise in the share of income spent on food and non-alcoholic beverages — from 40% in 2018 to 55% in 2022 — illustrates that citizens are not necessarily better off, despite receiving nominally higher wages. The increase in food prices has been compounded by the added burden of three consecutive years of electricity price hikes, the most recent occurring in April with a 16.1% increase.

For many families, especially those with lower incomes, economic hardship has increased. This suggests that the government’s wage-increase policies have lacked adequate support mechanisms to protect purchasing power — such as indexing social benefits to inflation or eliminating VAT on essential goods.

Have concrete steps been taken to promote sustainable economic development?

The lack of structural interventions in the economy can be seen in the increase in the trade deficit, which continues to be deeply negative, reflecting the economy’s heavy dependence on imports. The trade deficit has increased from -3.1 billion euros in 2019 to -5.39 billion euros in 2024.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been one of the most positive indicators during this mandate, increasing significantly from 345.7 million euros in 2020 to over 856 million euros in 2024. This doubling of FDI can be seen as a sign of political stability and an improvement in the business environment. However, most of these investments remain concentrated in real estate, rather than in sectors that create jobs and stimulate the economy in the long term.

Despite the increase in the number of active enterprises, from 37,000 in 2019 to over 52,000 in 2024, the informal economy remains a concern — accounting for a 28.5% in 2023, down from 31.7% in 2015. This indicates that a significant portion of economic activity continues to occur outside the fiscal and legal system, negatively impacting public revenues and fair competition.

The structure of the Kosovar economy remains fragile, heavily dependent on imports, remittances and foreign investment in sectors that do not significantly stimulate economic activity. Although the Kurti II government has managed to stabilize some economic indicators, without deeper structural reforms, these achievements may prove temporary.

One of the most important indicators for citizens is unemployment, an area in which the Kurti II government has claimed major success. Official data shows a substantial decrease in unemployment — from 25.9% in 2020 to 10.9% in 2023. This represents a notable achievement and is among the few areas where clear numerical improvement is evident.

But are we better prepared for the job market?

Beyond the overall figures, a critical segment is that of young people who are neither in education, employment nor training. This category — an indicator of social and economic inactivity among youth — has remained at alarmingly high and largely unchanged levels, hovering around 33% since 2020, with a slight decrease to 30.3% in the second quarter of 2024. This suggests that a significant portion of young people continue to remain outside the cycles of economic activity and vocational training.

Meanwhile, the number of students enrolled in public and private higher education has seen a drastic decline — from 104,000 in 2019 to around 71,000 in 2024. This drop, particularly in public universities, can be interpreted as a reflection of young people’s discouragement with academic programs that do not align with labor market demands. Although the Kurti II government waived tuition fees for public universities, this measure does not appear to have been enough to convince many students to continue their studies.

Public funding for education has declined as a percentage of GDP — from 4.6% in 2020 and 4.1% in 2021 to just 3.2% in 2023. Based on GDP growth projections for 2025 and the planned education budget, spending in this area is not expected to exceed 3.98%. This indicates that education has not been supported by budgetary allocations that reflect the need for quality improvement or systemic transformation.

One of the few positive indicators is a modest increase in the number of children enrolled in kindergartens and preschools — from 32,000 in 2019 to around 33,000 in 2024. However, progress remains minimal given the already low inclusion rates in early childhood education. The Kurti II government had pledged to build 160 kindergartens, aiming to increase early education coverage from 7% to 24% for children under five years old. By the final year of the mandate, only four kindergartens had been built and just 8.9% of children under five were enrolled in early education.

Meanwhile, the performance of Kosovar students in the 2022 PISA test declined compared to 2018, particularly in reading, mathematics and science.

Do we have better infrastructure?

According to the Kosovo Agency of Statistics, only 1.6 kilometers of roads were paved during the last four years of the mandate. The Kurti II government took over a road network of 2,432.40 kilometers in 2021, increasing it slightly to 2,434 kilometers by 2024, whilst the development of new roads has stagnated.

In July 2023, Kurti stated on his official Facebook account that the Prishtina to Gjilan highway would open within the year. Yet, almost two years later, no official date has been announced for its opening. In another case, the 38-meter bridge over a section of Badovci lake was closed to traffic on January 19, 2022 and was only completed on the final day of December 2024 — nearly two years later.

Upon taking office, the Kurti II government halted work on the Prishtina to Peja highway, only to resume the work towards the end of its mandate — without providing a clear completion date. The road connecting Klina to Gjakova has remained in the same condition, as have the long-delayed highway projects to Mitrovica and Podujeva, which have been under construction for many years.

Are we breathing easier?

At the start of the Kurti II government’s mandate in 2021, Kosovo inherited a challenging environmental situation. By 2024 however, little tangible progress had been made beyond the drafting of strategic documents. Many key indicators had either stagnated or worsened.

In 2024, 80.3% of vehicles on the road in Kosovo were over 10 years old. In addition to the fact that more than 92% of them run on diesel or gasoline, traffic remains one of the main contributors to air pollution. This is also reflected in methane emissions in urban areas where, according to data published by the World Bank, Kosovo has consistently ranked first in the Western Balkans for the highest per capita levels.

The consequences of pollution are tangible. Cases of lower respiratory tract infections rose from 8,900 in 2021 to 17,650 in 2024 — doubling in just three years. UNICEF warns that increased exposure to fine particulate matter raises the mortality rate of children under the age of five by 10%, making it up to 300% higher compared to areas with clean air.

Although the state collects hundreds of millions of euros annually through environmental taxes, its financial commitment to environmental protection remains minimal. In 2021, over 330 million euros were collected through environmental taxes, while only 9.5 million euros were allocated to environmental protection. By 2024, revenues had increased to 340 million euros but expenditures remained virtually unchanged at just 7.9 million euros. In other words, for every 100 euros collected, only 2 is spent on the environment.

In terms of waste management, Kosovo continues to rank towards the bottom in Europe, recycling only 2.5% of recyclable waste. While the number of illegal landfills has decreased slightly, from 763 in 2021 to 746 in 2023, progress remains symbolic and slow, with many municipalities still lacking efficient waste management systems.

Despite promises of a green transition and the inclusion of climate targets in policy documents, there has been no visible improvement in air quality, waste management or forest protection. The environment remains one of the most underfunded sectors, despite its direct impact on citizens’ health and quality of life.

What does it mean to succeed in governance?

The data presented above offer a clear picture of the lack of progress on the ground. They highlight the absence of structural improvements in the economy, education, environment and infrastructure, as well as the direct impact of inflation on citizens’ daily lives. Data is essential not only for measuring real progress but also for challenging political narratives. This article focuses solely on data directly related to citizens’ well-being; however, indicators in other areas — such as international recognition of Kosovo’s statehood, healthcare reform and the digitalization of public services — do not present a more optimistic picture.

It seems that even the most accurate statistics are not enough to shift the overall public perception. For voters, personal experience often carries more weight than macroeconomic indicators. This is because statistics, despite their importance, do not directly resonate with individual emotions, daily realities or aspirations.

This dynamic was also reflected in the issues that influenced citizens’ votes on February 9. After the polls closed, TV Dukagjini published the exit poll conducted by UBO Consulting. When respondents were asked what influenced their vote, the top three factors include 25.3% for the economy/employment, 20.3% for the fight against corruption and 11.9% for security. Health, education and inflation — issues that arguably have the most direct impact on daily life beyond the economy — ranked much lower on the list, with just 6.3%, 5.6% and 3.8%, respectively.

Therefore, measuring the success of a government remains a complex process — caught between cold statistics and lived experience, between measurable data and emotional trust. It is between these two worlds that the public debate must take place.

Feature image: Prime Minister’s Office.

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