In-depth | Elections 2025

Electoral competition among Serb parties

By - 07.02.2025

Six Serb political parties participated in the February 9 elections.

A record six Serb political parties competed in Kosovo’s general elections on February 9. Some are newly formed, while others have been active on the political scene for several years.

A key issue uniting five of the six parties in these elections is their opposition to the political dominance of Srpska Lista, which has long been the main party representing Kosovo Serbs. Since its emergence in 2013, Srpska Lista has won all local and parliamentary elections in Serb-majority municipalities.

In this election campaign, most parties advocate for independent representation, distancing themselves from the government of Aleksandar Vučić, president of Serbia, and from the government of Kosovo. They argue that neither has genuinely represented Kosovo Serbs’ interests. Throughout various media appearances and campaign events, these parties have accused Srpska Lista of monopolizing the political life of Serbs in Kosovo, prioritizing Belgrade’s interests over local Serbs’ real needs.

While they do not seek to sever ties with Serbia, they argue that Belgrade has failed to adequately represent their interests. They allege that by exerting influence through Srpska Lista, Belgrade has hindered political pluralism within the Serb community and suppressed alternative political voices advocating for solutions tailored to Kosovo Serbs.

Participating Parties

Serb parties that participated in Kosovo’s February 9 election are:

  • Srpska Lista (Serbian List)

  • Srpska Demokratija (Serbian Democracy)

  • Srpski Narodni Pokret (Serbian People’s Movement)

  • Za Slobodu Pravdu i Opstanak (For Freedom, Justice and Survival)

  • Partija Kosovskih Srba (Party of Kosovo Serbs)

  • Građanska Inijicijativa Narodna Pravda (Civic Initiative for People’s Justice).

Most of the parties competing in the February 9 elections describe Srpska Lista as corrupt and out of touch with the daily struggles of Kosovo Serbs. Throughout the campaign, they have repeatedly claimed that this political control has further isolated Kosovo Serbs and deprived them of genuine representation, shrinking the space for political diversity.

In their public appearances and campaigns, Serb parties also express dissatisfaction with the Kosovo government, particularly regarding the increased police presence in the north. They stress the need for Serb representation in Kosovo’s institutions. However, the proposals and positions put forward by most parties ahead of the elections reveal uncertainty regarding the recognition of Kosovo’s statehood and whether they have a long-term vision for political representation within Kosovo’s institutions as an independent republic.

Meanwhile, representatives of Serb civil society note that these elections mark a shift in the political landscape for citizens, especially following Srpska Lista’s withdrawal from Kosovo’s institutions in November 2022. This two-year absence, combined with the evolving political context, has contributed to the emergence of new political figures.

The political crisis stems from a long-standing dispute over vehicle license plates between Kosovo and Serbia. In June 2022, the Kosovo government issued two key decisions. The first required that anyone entering Kosovo with Serbia-issued identification documents be given a temporary declaration form, effectively replacing Serbian documents — a procedure that Serbia had applied to Kosovo citizens entering its territory since 2011.

The second decision mandated that all vehicles with Serbian-issued license plates bearing acronyms of cities in Kosovo must be re-registered with Kosovo RKS license plates. The implementation of this policy escalated tensions, leading to the erection of barricades at the Jarinje and Brnjak border crossings with Serbia. The situation escalated further after the suspension of Nenad Ðurić, the regional director of the Kosovo Police, for refusing to implement the decision.

In response, Serb representatives resigned from Kosovo’s public institutions, including the police, courts, municipalities and ministries. The mayors of the northern municipalities — North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavić and Zvečan — all Srpska Lista representatives, also stepped down, along with the Minister of Communities and Returns, Goran Rakić.

The boycott continued during the April 2023 special municipal elections, which were held to fill mayoral positions in the four northern municipalities. With Srpska Lista not participating, only 1,532 voters — just over 3% of the 45,095 registered voters — cast their ballots. Voters were largely limited to choosing among candidates from Albanian parties, as only one of the 10 candidates was Serb.

The elections triggered further tensions. In May 2023, Serb protesters gathered in front of the municipal buildings in Zvečan, Leposavić and Zubin Potok to block the newly elected mayors from taking office. At the same time, the embassies of the U.S. and QUINT countries repeatedly urged that the mayors operate from alternative locations rather than the municipal buildings.

These renewed tensions shifted focus to the failed dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and to an agreement that has become central to discussions on relations between the two states — the Agreement on the Path to Normalization between Kosovo and Serbia, along with its Implementation Plan, reached in Ohrid in 2023.

One of the key obligations of this agreement is the implementation of Article 7, which requires Kosovo to immediately begin negotiations on creating the necessary conditions and guarantees to ensure an appropriate level of self-management for the Serb community in Kosovo, in accordance with previous agreements reached in the dialogue. If this self-management is implemented in line with the 2013 Brussels Agreement, it would entail the establishment of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities.

Another event in 2023 further heightened tensions. In September 2023, an armed attack on the Kosovo Police (KP) — orchestrated by Srpska Lista deputy leader Milan Radoičić — ended in tragedy, resulting in the death of KP sergeant Afrim Bunjaku. Prime Minister Albin Kurti refused to return to dialogue without sanctions against the Serbian government for its alleged role in the Banjska attack, a demand he reiterated in international meetings and media appearances. Nonetheless, the EU did not take any action in this regard. The European Parliament later passed a resolution condemning the attack, labeling the perpetrators as “terrorists.” The resolution also called on Serbia to refrain from its repeated pattern of escalation.

2024 began with another controversial decision. On February 1, 2024, a new regulation of the Central Bank of Kosovo entered into force, establishing the euro as the only valid currency for cash payments and in the national payment system in Kosovo. Thousands of Kosovo Serb citizens receive salaries, pensions and financial assistance from the Serbian government in dinars. At the same time, the dinar was also used in Serb-majority settlements to make payments. The EU and QUINT ambassadors disagreed with this decision; they insisted on a transition phase before the regulation was implemented and demanded that this issue be addressed in dialogue.

Although the Kurti government initially refused for several days to include the dinar issue in the EU-mediated dialogue, calling the regulation an internal matter for the state of Kosovo, the issue was ultimately discussed within the framework of the dialogue.

Then, in July 2024, Kurti announced plans to reopen the main bridge over the Ibar River, which de facto divides southern Mitrovica, with an Albanian majority, from the northern part, inhabited primarily by Serbs. Kosovo Serbs protested against the reopening of the bridge, arguing that their security was being “endangered” and that they were “attacked as a people.” However, Kurti stood firm, stating that the move was a step toward peace.

But there was no peace. Later that year, in November 2024, the Iber-Lepenc canal in northern Kosovo, which supplies water to several cities, was attacked. The explosion, which the Kosovo Police reported was caused by approximately 20 kilograms of explosives, was widely regarded in Kosovo as one of the most serious attacks on critical infrastructure since the 1998-1999 war. Kurti accused Radoičić and the Serbian government of orchestrating the attack, while the Serbian government denied any involvement.

Meanwhile, the Kosovo government continued its efforts to close parallel institutions in various municipalities. In January 2025, during a police operation, the Kosovo Police closed 10 parallel municipalities, post offices and tax offices.

For now, the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia remains virtually the only platform for communication between the two governments. Attention is now focused on the approach of Peter Sørensen, the diplomat who recently replaced Miroslav Lajčák as the EU special representative for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. Both Lajčák and Josep Borrell, the former EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, faced criticism — from both the Kosovo government and MEPs — for ineffective mediation or a perceived one-sided approach to the dialogue. Following the recent European Parliament elections, Borrell was replaced by Kaja Kallas.

 

During a prolonged period of political boycotts, Srpska Lista refused to engage with Kosovo’s institutions, leading to a loss of Serb influence in key sectors like the judiciary, police forces and municipal governance. Opposition parties now seek to reclaim this influence.

This environment — in which Kosovo Serbs have often felt insecure, threatened and unrepresented — appears to have mobilized several political parties to participate in the elections. Opposition factions, in particular, are attempting to fill the gap in political representation.

According to Kosovo’s Constitution, 10 parliamentary seats are reserved for the Serb community. These votes are crucial for passing key laws and constitutional amendments. A 2021 study by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS) found that politics for Kosovo Serbs has been constrained by economic dependence on Belgrade and external pressures to participate in Kosovo’s institutions.

Despite efforts to assert political influence, the study notes that Kosovo Serbs have struggled to establish themselves as significant political actors due to demographic decline, a lack of human resources and the loss of the community’s intellectual elite. 

In this context of political stagnation — and following a long period in which Srpska Lista monopolized political representation — Kosovo Serb civil society views the emergence of multiple competing initiatives as an opportunity to foster political pluralism.

  • Srpska Lista

Since its founding, Srpska Lista has been a vocal player in Kosovo’s politics, particularly within the Serb community. The party has consistently won — without serious challenge — all 10 parliamentary seats reserved for the Serb minority in the Kosovo Assembly, solidifying its influence in both local governance and central decision-making. Srpska Lista has played a key role in Kosovo’s governing coalitions, securing ministerial positions while maintaining close ties with Belgrade.

From the outset, Srpska Lista has faced accusations of voter intimidation and political pressure. Initially established as a citizens’ initiative, Srpska Lista became a political party in 2017. It first emerged during Kosovo’s municipal elections in November 2013, a period when many Kosovo Serbs — particularly in the north — opposed integration into the country’s institutions. Monitoring reports from those elections highlighted instances of voter pressure, with allegations that Srpska Lista actively worked to ensure citizen participation while simultaneously pressuring voters to support Srpska Lista as the sole political entity.

Srpska Lista was entrusted with implementing the provisions of the First Agreement on the Normalization of Relations between Serbia and Kosovo. This primarily involved closing Serbian institutions and integrating their employees into Kosovo’s administrative structures. However, critics have long accused Srpska Lista of monopolizing Kosovo Serbs’ political life, failing to improve the community’s living conditions and securing votes through clientelistic hiring practices.

It is not uncommon for opposition candidates or parties to join Srpska Lista’s electoral list. A notable example is when several members of Serbia, Democracy, Justice Civic Initiative, the party led by Oliver Ivanović, joined Srpska Lista in the 2019 parliamentary elections — just a year after Ivanović’s assassination on January 16, 2018. Ivanović was widely regarded as Srpska Lista’s most significant political opponent in the north.

One of Srpska Lista’s key figures, former deputy leader Milan Radoičić, was suspected of involvement in Ivanović’s murder. The Special Prosecution Office issued an arrest warrant for Radoičić in August 2020, but in February 2021, the warrant was withdrawn “for technical and tactical reasons to facilitate a better investigation of the criminal offenses he is suspected of being involved in,” according to the ruling. Radoičić, one of the most influential figures among Kosovo Serbs, was also identified as the main organizer of the attack on the Kosovo Police in Banjska.

Since the mass boycott of Kosovo institutions, Srpska Lista representatives have appeared in the Kosovo Assembly only when necessary to maintain their mandates, roughly every six months.

In December 2024, Kosovo’s Central Election Commission (CEC) initially refused to certify Srpska Lista for the February 2025 parliamentary elections, citing its nationalist rhetoric and ties to Serbia. However, the party successfully appealed, and the Electoral Complaints and Appeals Panel overturned the decision, allowing Srpska Lista to participate.

Meanwhile, accusations of intimidation and harassment of political opponents, a consistent feature of Srpska Lista’s political journey, appear to be continuing in this election as well. For example, the Kosovo Serb Party stated in a media release that a Srpska Lista delegate, Marko Arsić, attacked the party’s stand in Gračanica, destroying promotional materials. The case has been reported to the Kosovo Police.

At the same time, Srpska Lista claims that it has also been targeted. Party member Milan Kostić said that the tires of his private car were slashed between February 1 and 2, an incident Srpska Lista has described as an attempt at intimidation ahead of the elections.

Srpska Lista launched its 2025 election campaign in Ranillug, south of the Ibar River, where party leader Zlatan Elek emphasized the party’s commitment to uniting the Serb community on both sides of the Ibar. Although Srpska Lista has not published an online platform, its rhetoric centers on rallying the Serb community against the Kosovo authorities, with Serbia’s support, to “remove the fake leaders and Kurti’s collaborators.”

As part of its campaign, Srpska Lista is visiting families and institutions that have benefited from Serbian state support, emphasizing that its role — alongside Serbia’s assistance — is crucial for Kosovo Serbs’ survival. Meanwhile, Serbian President Vučić urged Kosovo Serbs to turn out in large numbers for the elections and expressed his full support for Srpska Lista.

  • Za Slobodu Pravdu i Opstanak

Nenad Rašić, one of the most prominent Serb politicians in Kosovo, leads the Za Slobodu, Pravdu i Opstanak (ZSPO) political party, or For Freedom, Justice and Survival in English. ZSPO is the only Serb party currently part of the Kosovo government. Rašić launched his campaign from the Sharr Mountains, in front of the Narcis hotel in Štrpce. In a video recorded at the site, he explained that the location was chosen symbolically to highlight neglected assets and to criticize two decades of mismanagement, a reference to Srpska Lista.

Rašić’s political journey began in 2006, when he co-founded the Samostalna Liberalna Stranka (SLS) — Independent Liberal Party — which was the main Serb party in the Kosovo Assembly until Srpska Lista’s rise. In January 2008, he was appointed minister of labor and social welfare in Hashim Thaçi’s government, a position he held until 2014. Due to internal disagreements, he left SLS in 2013 and, in March 2014, founded the Progresivna Demokratska Stranka (PDS), the Progressive Democratic Party.

In the 2014 parliamentary elections, PDS received 0.82% of the vote, earning Rašić a seat in the Kosovo Assembly. He later joined the Serbian List parliamentary group but eventually distanced himself from it. As leader of PDS, he launched an initiative that later evolved into ZSPO. This initiative participated in the 2021 elections but failed to secure any seats.

In December 2022, following Rakić’s resignation and Srpska Lista’s boycott of Kosovo institutions, Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti appointed Rašić as minister for communities and returns — a decision that drew strong criticism from Serb political representatives. Srpska Lista condemned the appointment as unconstitutional, while Vučić disparagingly referred to Rašić as “the worst Serbian scum.” Dissatisfaction with his role in the government continues to be voiced by his political opponents even today.

For example, during a visit to Leposavić, members of the Srpska Demokratija (Serbian Democracy) party protested against Rašić, accusing him of refusing to support the re-establishment of the Serbian flag on the municipal building. Additionally, Srpska Demokratija filed a criminal complaint against Rašić’s party, alleging vote-buying — a claim that Rašić and his party have denied.

In its program, ZSPO emphasizes European values, human rights and the rule of law. Its main objectives include reforming the political system, combating corruption, supporting economic development and promoting energy efficiency.

The party advocates for greater political accountability, increased citizen involvement in decision-making, public administration reform and the strengthening of local self-government. It also emphasizes the importance of supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly by developing micro-enterprises and agriculture, drawing on European experiences and regional development funds.

Regarding energy efficiency, the party supports strategic planning in the energy sector, including gasification and the development of infrastructure for transporting oil and gas from new supply sources.

The party emphasizes European values as a foundation for stability, advocating for Kosovo’s integration into the EU by aligning with European standards and principles, respecting diversity and promoting coexistence among all ethnic communities.

ZSPO also prioritizes social policies, aiming to ensure citizens’ rights to healthcare, education, and social care, with special attention to non-majority communities.

Rašić has expressed expectations for intensified efforts after the elections to achieve more concrete progress in the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. On various occasions, he has also highlighted the importance of Serbian representation in the police and judiciary.

  • Srpska Demokratija 

Aleksandar Arsenijević, leader of Srpska Demokratija, is a prominent activist for Kosovo Serbs’ rights, frequently participating in protests against Kosovo government policies in the north. In 2021, he founded the civic initiative Srpski Opstanak (Serbian Survival), which later transformed into the political party Srpska Demokratija in December 2023.

He has been actively involved in protests against the increased presence of the Kosovo Police and special forces in the north. His activism has led to several arrests, often for symbolic acts — such as whistling in protest against local and central authorities, particularly Kurti and his government.

In recent months, Arsenijević has been arrested multiple times for whistling, under the alleged pretext of disturbing public order. His arrest during Kurti’s visit to North Mitrovica on September 10, 2024, and subsequent detention, was condemned by civil society organizations and human rights activists, who emphasized that he was protesting peacefully. It is therefore no coincidence that one of Srpska Demokratija’s main pledges, according to its election program, is to protect Serbs’ rights to freedom of expression, protest and free movement. To this end, Srpska Demokratija plans to publish biannual reports on the situation of Serbs in Kosovo, covering issues related to security, the economy and social conditions.

An important component of Srpska Demokratija’s program is the return of Serbs displaced by the 1998-99 war in Kosovo, an issue that has remained unresolved since the post-war period. In 1999, over 200,000 Serbs fled Kosovo to Serbia, but only a few thousand have returned since then. The party plans to pressure the Ministry for Communities and Returns to adopt a new approach to repatriation, including quarterly progress reports to track developments.

On the international stage, Srpska Demokratija plans to lobby the EU to oversee Kosovo’s return policies and integrate them into the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. The party also calls on Belgrade to establish support programs for returnees, which would be overseen by an independent commission composed of Serbian nongovernmental organizations in Kosovo, media representatives, academics and political figures from both sides.

An important part of Srpska Demokratija’s program is the protection and promotion of the Serbian language and culture in Kosovo. The program emphasizes that Serbs are a key political entity in Kosovo, not merely a minority, and calls for greater recognition of their cultural rights.

In this context, the party plans to organize conferences in Prishtina on the challenges of Serb integration, as well as facilitate meetings between civil society representatives from northern and southern Kosovo. One symbolic demand is the official recognition of Serbian Flag Day, with an annual celebration in Prishtina, where the flags of all communities would be displayed. The party argues that such measures would serve as a test of Kosovo’s sincerity in its efforts to foster reconciliation between communities.

While the party views cooperation with Belgrade as necessary, it insists that this cooperation remain exclusively technical and not political. Srpska Demokratija emphasizes that Serbs in Kosovo should maintain strong financial, cultural and infrastructural ties with Serbia, regardless of which political party holds power in Belgrade.

Perhaps the party’s most ambitious objective is the formation of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities, envisioned as a mechanism for Serb autonomy in Kosovo, providing economic stability, security and a legal framework for cultural, economic and territorial self-governance.

If the Kosovo government rejects the creation of the association, Srpska Demokratija states that it will seek U.S. support for a unilateral declaration. The party argues that if Kosovo was able to declare independence unilaterally, then Serbs should also have the right to establish the association independently.

  • Srpski Narodni Pokret

Srpski Narodni Pokret (SNP) — Serbian People’s Movement — is a newly-formed Serb political party, created amid the political tensions in northern Kosovo in recent years.

Founded in Zubin Potok in late 2023, the party positions itself as an alternative to existing political structures, advocating for the return of political representation to Serb citizens. It also criticizes both Kosovar and Serbian authorities for their treatment of the Serb community in Kosovo.

The party’s leaders, Milija Biševac and Branimir Stojanović, have been outspoken in their support for direct representation of Serbs in Kosovo, opposing the domination of decision-making by both Serbia and Kosovo.

“We will no longer accept a system where our people have to blindly follow political orders. Our people can no longer be governed without their direct participation,” said Stojanović during a press conference in front of RTS in Belgrade, criticizing Serbian state television for favoring Srpska Lista and for its lack of coverage of the Kosovo elections. He also stated, “Kosovo Albanian leaders can no longer rely on the fact that negotiations will be conducted exclusively with representatives like Milan Radoičić and Nenad Rašić.”

SNP’s published program emphasizes that the party was founded in response to tensions in Serb-majority areas, with the goal of preserving Serbian culture and national heritage. SNP positions itself as a party that defends Serbian national interests from the perspective of those living in Kosovo, rather than those making decisions from outside — referring to both Kosovo and Serbian authorities. While their proposed policies do not specify implementation strategies, they primarily focus on improving the daily lives of Kosovo Serbs.

SNP condemns the lack of political freedom and criticizes the current system, arguing that the existing political options for Serbs in Kosovo have failed to address the real, everyday challenges faced by the Serb community. The party also criticizes Srpska Lista, accusing it of monopolizing political power, depriving the Serb community of genuine representation and engaging in nepotism and corruption.

One of SNP’s primary missions is combating corruption and clientelism, particularly within municipalities and public institutions. The party argues that under Srpska Lista’s leadership, economic development, education, healthcare and culture have suffered significant decline. It further asserts that infrastructural issues in the healthcare sector are a direct consequence of clientelistic hiring and nepotism. To address this, SNP proposes transparent selection processes in public employment, improvements to health infrastructure and the creation of new health centers.

SNP also highlights legal uncertainty as a major concern for Serbs in Kosovo, who face limited access to legal representation due to high costs, a lack of respect for the Serbian language in public institutions and low participation of Serbs in the judicial system. As a solution, SNP proposes the creation of “Pravna Klinika” (Legal Clinic), which would provide free legal services to citizens in need of assistance.

Finally, SNP identifies the lack of youth engagement in politics as a significant issue. To address this, the party proposes encouraging young people to study political science and the social sciences, improving the quality of vocational schools and strengthening the connection between education and the labor market.

  • Partia Kosovskih Srba

Partia Kosovskih Srba (PKS) — Party of Kosovo Serbs — is a political entity founded in May 2017. Although PKS has a relatively short political history, its leader, Aleksandar Jablanović, has been an active figure in Kosovo Serb politics for many years. Jablanović is best known as the founder and first chairman of Srpska Lista. In 2014, Srpska Lista became part of the Kosovo government, and Jablanović was appointed minister for communities and returns. He held the position for only two months before being dismissed by then-Prime Minister Isa Mustafa.

His dismissal followed an incident on Orthodox Christmas Eve in 2015, when Jablanović referred to Albanian protesters who had blocked displaced Serbs from visiting a church in Gjakova as “savages.” His statement triggered widespread backlash and mass protests across Kosovo, ultimately leading to his removal from the government.

After his dismissal from the Kosovo government, Jablanović was appointed state secretary at the Serbian Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veterans and Social Affairs. His tenure ended in controversy when his brother was arrested for drug trafficking while using an official ministry vehicle. Following the incident, Jablanović resigned, taking full responsibility for allowing his brother to use the government car.

During the election campaign, PKS has primarily focused on criticizing Srpska Lista, accusing it of prioritizing personal interests over the interests of Serbs in Kosovo. The party’s rhetoric is largely centered on attacks against Srpska Lista, without presenting a clear or concrete political platform.

“Our motto is that we are on our own land. Those who are against Serbia here in Kosovo are the ones engaging in politics that harm the Serbian people,” Jablanović said at the first rally of the election campaign in Gračanica. “Just because we may think differently at times from those in power in Belgrade does not mean that we are against Serbia.”

He added that the Srpska Lista had opened the doors to “Kurti and the Kosovo Police” and that its decision to withdraw from institutions had caused significant harm to Serbian citizens.

  • Građanska Inijicijativa Narodna Pravda

At a pre-election rally in Zubin Potok, the leader of Građanska Inijicijativa Narodna Pravda (NP) — Civic Initiative for People’s Justice — Radoica Radomirović, pledged to serve all citizens, emphasizing economic development as a priority while also advocating for the return of Serbs to key positions in the police and judiciary.

“Our first and main goal is the return of police officers, especially those who were forced to leave their jobs, as well as the return of prosecutors and judges,” said Radomirović.

Radomirović criticized the current appointments in the Kosovo Police, stating that it is “unacceptable for an Albanian to be the commander of the police station in Zvečan, Leposavić, Mitrovica or Zubin Potok.” He added that this is not a matter of ethnic discrimination but rather a question of respecting the Brussels Agreement, which, according to him, stipulates that commanders in Serb-majority areas must be Serbs. At the same time, Narodna Pravda also emphasized its commitment to maintaining constructive relations with both Serbia and Kosovo.

“We want good relations with Belgrade and Prishtina. We want to be a bridge of reconciliation between them,” Radomirović said.

Reinforcing this stance, the party’s candidate for the Assembly, Grozdan Biševac, acknowledged the dual reality of Serbs in Kosovo, stating: “We are Serbs, and of course, we look to Belgrade — where else would we look? But we live in Kosovo, and we must respect the law and maintain good relations with Prishtina.”

Radomirović has served as a deputy minister in Kosovo’s government since May 2023, under Rašić, the minister of communities and returns. In September 2024, Rašić dismissed Radomirović from his position. According to Kossev reporting, Rašić accused him of collaborating with the Serbian Intelligence Agency. However, Radomirović has denied these allegations and, in turn, accused Rašić of neglecting the Serb population in northern Kosovo, particularly by highlighting financial inequities in the distribution of resources by the Ministry of Communities and Returns.

NP was founded in September 2013 in Leposavić, shortly before the first local elections in northern Kosovo. It secured one seat in the municipal assembly but failed to gain representation in the 2017 elections. The party’s leader, Nenad Radosavljević, has been an active figure in Kosovo’s political scene for over two decades. He served as mayor of Leposavić from 2000 to 2001, and was a member of the Coalition for Return in the Kosovo Assembly in 2001.

In 2017, former party leader Radosavljević introduced a political program, which he republished on social media ahead of the 2024 election campaign, focusing on economic growth, infrastructure development, education, and culture.

In this older program, NP proposed establishing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities as a “special entity” with its own independent assembly to govern local affairs. This framework aimed to grant Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo a higher degree of autonomy, distancing them from Kosovo’s central institutions in Prishtina.

The program also envisioned a unified Serb-led security structure in northern Kosovo. However, it remains unclear whether these positions have changed or how the party currently views the creation of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities.

 

Additonal reporting by Aulonë Kadriu.

Feature image: Dina Hajrullahu / K2.0

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