Kosovo’s relations — or lack thereof — with Serbia dominate foreign policy discussions and continue to shape Kosovo’s ties with the U.S. and European Union. Economic measures implemented by the EU against Kosovo in 2023 remain in effect, while the EU-led Kosovo-Serbia dialogue has been stalled since 2023.

Moreover, there was only one new international recognition in the past government’s term: Kenya, in late March 2025. Before that, the most recent recognition came from Israel in 2020, after a Washington-brokered agreement between Kosovo and Israel that culminated in visa-free travel to Israel for Kosovo passport holders. This relationship has lately been under public scrutiny, given the broad public disapproval of Israel’s invasion of Gaza in Kosovo.

But despite these challenges, a number of potential avenues for deepening Kosovo’s international reach remain untapped. Now, with the U.S. potentially reducing its role as security guarantor in Europe and the EU stretched increasingly thin, Kosovo must also lay the groundwork for new relations and future recognitions around the world to secure its place on the global stage.

Given the already strained relations with some of Kosovo’s closest partners, a crumbling global political order and waning international interest, the incoming government should aim to revamp Kosovo’s overall approach to international politics, while also patching up relations with its closest and most vital relationships. 

From old friends…

Societal and cultural ties to Albania remain ever-present, but cooperation at a government level suffered amid an at-times combative partnership between Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and Albin Kurti, prime minister of Kosovo since 2021. This stems from a simmering dispute over who best represents Albanians on an international level and Rama’s openness to working with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić on regional projects like Open Balkan. 

Resetting relations between government officials to ensure positive, enhanced cross-border cooperation, must be the first step in any new framework. From this point, Tirana and Prishtina could look to deepen their already extensive partnerships in areas like trade, culture, education and environmental protection, while supporting each other’s paths to EU integration and collaborating in multilateral defense initiatives.

Kosovo’s relations with the EU have also deteriorated in recent years. This stems in part from the Kurti government’s often strong-handed approach to tackling Belgrade-funded parallel institutions across Kosovo Serb communities. 

If Kosovo can work more constructively with the EU in Ursula von der Leyen’s second term as European Commission president, the upcoming years could be a turning point in Kosovo-EU relations. Already, the commission is looking to prepare countries across the region — namely Montenegro and Albania — for potential accession to the bloc within its current mandate, which runs to 2029. While Kosovo’s EU membership remains a distant goal, concrete steps can be made in the coming years to ensure its timely accession.

The U.S. has historically been Kosovo’s biggest supporter, but the relationship may undergo a drastic shift in Donald Trump’s second presidency. Trump has upended the U.S.’ long-standing dominant role in global affairs, removing the U.S. from various international organizations, cancelling over 80% of foreign aid projects and casting skepticism on whether the U.S. would defend NATO allies.

The return of former U.S. envoy to Serbia and Kosovo negotiations, Richard Grenell, now in the expanded role of special presidential envoy for special missions, has also raised concern in Prishtina. Grenell’s alleged favoring of Serbia during negotiations during Trump’s first term, as well as his friendly ties with Vučić and clear dislike of Kurti, all point toward a tricky path forward for Kosovo-U.S. relations. 

Moreover, Trump and Vice President JD Vance’s scathing ambush on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in late February showed that Trump is willing to humiliate and bully foreign leaders he doesn’t like into hasty deals that can be spun as victories. This could possibly lead to the proposal of a final resolution to Kosovo-Serbia normalization talks that leaves all sides in uncomfortable positions domestically. Possible scenarios include Serbia having to de-facto recognize Kosovo’s statehood, Kosovo having to finally establish an Association of Serbian Municipalities, or both agreeing to a deal achieving little more than promised deeper economic ties, similar to the 2020 Washington Agreement, very little of which was ever implemented. 

…to new allies

Beyond restoring strong ties with some of Kosovo’s closest allies, the new government should also take steps to garner additional diplomatic recognition. One of the previous government’s key international shortcomings was its failure — until Kenya’s recognition was announced in March 2025 — to acquire any new recognition of Kosovo’s statehood. Even that, though, came through the efforts of Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani and businessman Behgjet Pacolli. Moreover, Serbia has even claimed that some states across Africa, Oceania and the Caribbean withdrew previous recognitions. 

Much of this can be attributed to Kosovo already having been recognized by over half the world’s states; many of the remainders are either outright opposed to ever recognizing Kosovo or claim they will not recognize Kosovo until normalization of relations with Serbia. But this does not mean that the next government should abandon efforts to secure more recognitions.

Normalizing ties with all EU member states remains paramount to Kosovo’s continued path to Euro-Atlantic integration. Although it remains unlikely that Romania, Cyprus and Spain will recognize Kosovo’s independence before any final agreement with Serbia is signed, Greece and Slovakia present opportunities for future cooperation. 

Kosovo’s expanding economic and political ties with Greece are a strong blueprint for increasing engagement with non-recognizers, with the potential to eventually lead to full recognition. 

Although Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico and his hardline social-conservative, euroskeptic government have no intention of recognizing Kosovo, Fico’s grip on power is weakening and a more liberal opposition coming to power may open a pathway for Prishtina to finally gather full recognition from Bratislava. 

At the very least, ensuring enhanced cooperation and dialogue with the five EU non-recognizers would allow the government further opportunities to deepen its path to European integration, while always aiming for the maximum recognition from any potential states where possible. 

Further out, the government has taken incremental steps toward deepening its international reach, with President Vjosa Osmani flying to Colombia in late 2024 to open Kosovo’s first embassy in South America — handily located beside the country’s sole Central American embassy, in Panama. The opening of the embassy should mark the first step in a more proactive approach toward relying less on relations with the West, and toward diversifying and deepening bilateral ties with a wider range of partners in South and Central America, Africa, Asia and Oceania. 

Beyond the EU, Kosovo has numerous potential recognizers and future partners it could deepen its collaboration with. Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Kyiv has worked more collaboratively with Kosovo, with officials stating their hopes that Ukraine fully recognizes Kosovo after the war. Non-recognizers Armenia and Moldova finally made it possible for carriers of Kosovo passports to enter, with a visa of some form. 

Elsewhere, politicians from Tunisia and South Sudan have either met with Kosovo government officials or stated their intention to discuss full recognition of Kosovo’s statehood. Developing these positive inroads allows Kosovo to expand its international footprint on a political and economic standing, with the potential to garner stronger support for its ongoing bids to join various international organizations in the coming years. 

Welcome to the club

Gaining membership in international organizations could also represent a way for Kosovo to secure its sovereignty and allow for more platforms for dialogue with global partners. One obvious target is membership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which focuses on promoting peace and security through education, arts, science and cultural heritage. 

Kosovo last tried to secure UNESCO membership in 2015, when it narrowly missed the two-thirds votes in favor tally — 92 votes in favor out of 142 votes cast, 95 required for approval — needed for membership. Were Kosovo to consider a renewed membership bid, now with a handful more recognitions from voting members — Bangladesh, Barbados, Madagascar, Singapore and Suriname — than back in 2015, UNESCO membership could soon be a serious possibility. This would allow Kosovo to better promote its rich cultural history and various communities at a global level.

Finalizing Kosovo’s bid to join the Council of Europe (CoE) should also be a feasible target for the next government. Although Kosovo was close to securing full membership in 2024, following overwhelming votes in support of its membership during a session of the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly, the bid was eventually halted by Germany, claiming Kosovo had failed to properly take steps toward implementing the Association of Serb Municipalities. 

More recently, Kosovo’s attempt to claim “special status” in the organization was rebuffed in March 2025, after a request from a Spanish representative got any further discussions on incorporating Kosovo removed from the agenda. Regardless, the incoming government should continue to push Kosovo’s membership application forward. Membership would allow Kosovo to better cooperate with its partners across the continent on human rights affairs, and gives Kosovars access to the European Court of Human Rights.

For EU accession, Kosovo faces substantial unique hurdles — namely garnering full recognition from all EU member states and normalizing relations with Serbia. However, Kosovo’s overall score, as published in the EU’s annual report on potential members’ progress in adapting the acquis required for membership, is actually higher than current candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, tied with negotiating candidate Moldova and only slightly behind candidate state Georgia. 

As certain candidate countries — namely Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina — have fallen back on their progress in reforming to EU standards, Kosovo has a clear chance at highlighting its own remarkable progress in the coming years. If Kosovo can maintain its current progress, it will show its seriousness in aligning itself with EU standards in preparation for any future membership negotiations to the bloc’s remaining non-recognizers. 

Future governments could also test the waters on potential membership in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Although Kosovo first applied for membership back in 2015, its bid stalled and was fully withdrawn by Ramush Haradinaj’s interim government in late 2019. This followed successive failed attempts to reach the necessary two-thirds of votes in favor, with a strong contingent of no votes rallied by Serbia and other non-recognizers in INTERPOL.

As with UNESCO, two-thirds of voting member states must approve of any potential membership bid, which should be possible with the right diplomatic push. Full membership would not only further Kosovo’s fight against organized crime and corruption, but also allow the collaboration and knowledge from international partners to better develop its own domestic policing services.

On the defense front, membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) would not only be a key step toward eventual membership in NATO, but would also allow the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) to better engage with allies across the organization. Although PfP was first formed to enhance military cooperation between former Soviet states and NATO members after the Cold War, it is now often seen as an integral, if informal, first stage in acceding to NATO. 

For PfP membership to happen, the KSF would have to develop into a fully-fledged Kosovo Armed Forces, a move that successive governments have pledged and failed to see through. Nonetheless, incremental steps have been taken, with additional funding for modernizing the security forces and gradual legislative changes preparing the legal groundwork for the eventual changeover, which would require thoroughly updating Kosovo’s ground defense and intelligence capabilities. Kosovo’s recent signing of a military agreement with Albania and Croatia shows its intention to bolster its defense capabilities and boost its developing arms industry.

Such a development in Kosovo’s defense infrastructure could also better ensure Kosovo’s security from external aggressive forces, while continuing to align its standards with Western partners. This too remains part of a longer-term strategy, given the highly likely blocking of any membership bid within the PfP by a non-recognizing NATO member like Spain or Romania. 

As much as there shall be challenges, namely healing strained ties to some of Kosovo’s closest partners, dealing with the Trump administration and re-entering talks with Serbia, there are also clear opportunities for Kosovo’s next government to expand Kosovo’s global presence. 

Pursuing deeper economic and political ties with new partners abroad would in itself be a measured improvement over recent years. If Kosovo can go further and claim more recognition abroad, or even deeper integration into various international organizations, it can continue to solidify its place in the international community. There is room for Kosovo to become a dynamic, constructive partner on the world stage; the new government must ensure this takes its place.

Feature image: K2.0.

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