Three days after the first constitutive session of the new legislature was held on April 15, the constitutional process remains deadlocked. During that session — which followed the certification of the results of the general elections held on February 9 — the swearing-in of the 120 new deputies and the vote for the Assembly’s presidency were expected to take place. The constitution of the Assembly is a prerequisite for the formation of the new government.

The process stalled at the very first step.

As the first item on the agenda, the Committee for the Verification of Quorum and Mandates (CVQM) was formed, made up of representatives from all parties that secured enough votes to be represented in the Assembly. The committee drafted a report verifying the 120 mandates certified by the Central Election Commission (CEC), which was then submitted for a vote by the deputies.

But the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) — often referred to as the “opposition bloc” in public discourse — voted against the report. According to them, the main reason was the absence of formal resignations from acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti and several ministers in his government, who had already been elected as deputies. Kurti and the ministers, however, stated that they had submitted their resignations on April 15, the day of the session.

At the same time as the session was taking place, a letter of resignation from Kurti addressed to Speaker of the Assembly Glauk Konjufca was made public. Meanwhile, the ministers claimed to have personally submitted their resignations to Kurti. The validity of this form of resignation was contested by several opposition parties and civil society organizations.

After the constitutive session — which was led by the oldest elected deputy, Avni Dehari from Vetëvendosje (VV) — adjourned, Dehari stated that he would ask President Vjosa Osmani about how to proceed, given the unprecedented situation.

VV and the opposition bloc blamed each other for the failure of the constitutive session. VV accused the opposition of blocking the process, while the opposition argued that Kurti was violating the Constitution by simultaneously holding both a parliamentary mandate and an executive position. In a reaction posted on Facebook, Kurti described the opposition’s refusal to vote on the report — including PDK, LDK, AAK and Lista Srpska — as “an internal institutional attack against the Republic of Kosovo and democratic elections.” The opposition bloc maintained that Kurti’s failure to formally resign constituted a constitutional violation, as he cannot be sworn in as a deputy while still holding an executive role.

This uncertainty surrounding the resignations became the source of the first political clash among those who have secured enough votes to be part of the next Assembly.

The following day, Osmani invited the deputies to hold a new session within 48 hours, as stipulated by the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. A second session aimed at moving the process forward was held on Thursday, April 17, but it also ended in failure. After a brief consultation with party representatives, the chair of the session, Avni Dehari, chose not to put the report to a vote, citing a lack of political consensus on how to proceed.

The third session is scheduled for Saturday, April 19, but since the issues that led to the current impasse remain unaddressed, the process of constituting the institutions risks becoming hostage to repeated sessions. According to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, these sessions must be held every 48 hours until the Assembly is officially constituted.

This phase could be resolved on Saturday if the necessary votes are secured — beginning with the approval of the CVQM report — which would pave the way for the subsequent stages of constituting the Assembly and forming the new government.

(Un)clarity of resignation

According to the Law on Government, adopted during the Kurti government, in 2022, if a member of the incumbent government is elected as a deputy of the Assembly, they must resign from their executive position before the certification of the election results. Because the CEC certified the results on March 27, this means that, under the law, Kurti and the members of his government who were elected as deputies should have submitted their resignations no later than March 26.

However, in a Facebook post on March 27, Kurti argued that the government’s mandate had effectively ended on March 23 — the day it, according to him, transitioned into an acting government. He claimed that this status was “effectively like the government in resignation in previous mandates,” as stated in the post. For this reason, he argued, a formal resignation was not necessary. Nevertheless, he submitted a letter of resignation on April 15.

Meanwhile, uncertainty remains regarding the resignations of government members who have been elected as deputies. According to Article 6 of the Law on the Duties and Rights of a Deputy, a deputy cannot simultaneously hold executive functions. The article also stipulates that a deputy’s mandate begins upon certification by the CEC. According to acting Minister of Justice Albulena Haxhiu, she and the other government members elected as deputies had already confirmed their acceptance of the mandate with the CEC, and the certification by this institution, in her view, indicated that there were no legal obstacles. However, the constitutionality of the CEC’s decision has also been called into question.

Haxhiu acknowledged that resignation was an obligation, stating after the constitutive session that the resignations had been submitted to Kurti on April 15 and that, in her words, “we have fulfilled the obligations we had by resigning, each of us.”

Despite these declarations, following the April 15 session, Kurti and his ministers returned to their government offices, where they held meetings, made decisions and even reappointed individuals to public positions — actions that contradict Article 31 of the Law on Government, which prohibits a government in resignation from initiating such procedures.

Following the resignation of government members elected as deputies, the government would continue to function through the remaining members who do not hold parliamentary mandates — such as deputy (prime) ministers — as well as through the public administration and other supporting structures, until a new executive is elected. Despite this mechanism being designed to address such situations, Kurti and his resigned cabinet members argued that their continued presence in government was necessary to avoid the risks that a leadership vacuum could pose.

However, the entire issue of resignation — specifically how, when, or even if it should take place — remains unclear, with various interpretations emerging.

One interpretation, held by the Kosovo Democratic Institute (KDI), is that Kurti and the cabinet members elected as deputies should have resigned the day before the certification of the election results by the CEC. Describing the situation as an “unnecessary political and institutional crisis,” KDI has called for the formal resignation of the prime minister and elected ministers/MPs in order to “enable the conclusion of the constitutive session of the Assembly.”

On the other hand, the Kosovo Law Institute (KLI) has stated that the uncertainties surrounding the resignation of government cabinet members stem from the lack of adequate regulation within the Law on Government. In order to ensure institutional functionality, KLI argues that the constitutional and legal provisions in this situation should be interpreted to mean that members of the government must resign at the moment they take the oath as deputies.

According to KLI, the letter submitted by Kurti does not constitute a formal resignation. His interpretation that the government has entered an incumbent status may apply to the institution as a whole, but not to him personally as prime minister. KLI argues that the content of Kurti’s letter reflects his intention to continue leading the government while also serving as a deputy — a stance that contradicts the relevant legal provisions.

Based on KLI’s interpretation of the law, Kurti was required to resign at the moment of taking the oath as a deputy. Once that happens, the acting government can no longer be led by him; leadership should pass to the deputy prime minister, while ministries are to be overseen by deputy ministers, except in cases where the respective minister has not been elected as a deputy.

Meanwhile, this unclear situation was perceived as a political signal that VV had not yet secured the 61 votes needed to form a new government. Although VV representatives have insisted that they do have the votes, the failure to pass the mandate verification report with a simple majority of 61 deputies — with only 52 out of 113 deputies present voting in favor — suggested that a parliamentary majority had not yet been consolidated.

How do the numbers stand?

In the last general elections, held on February 9, VV won 42.3% of the vote, securing 48 seats in the Kosovo Assembly. To form a government, at least 61 votes are required, meaning that VV is 13 seats short. It remains unclear whether this majority has been secured and attempts to build new alliances have been met with rejection so far.

VV has ruled out forming a coalition with Srpska Lista, which holds nine seats. Meanwhile, the three opposition bloc parties — PDK, LDK and AAK — have refused to cooperate with VV on forming a government. An attempt to break the deadlock occurred on April 7, when Kurti sent an invitation for a consultative meeting to LDK leader Lumir Abdixhiku. Abdixhiku rejected the invitation, citing Kurti’s offensive rhetoric during the election campaign. On the night the first exit poll results were released, on February 9, Kurti publicly referred to the opposition parties as “fools” during a statement delivered from downtown Prishtina.

One of the most likely scenarios involves securing votes from non-majority non-Serb communities, which hold 10 seats in the Assembly. If VV manages to gain the support of all 10 deputies from these communities, along with the three deputies from the Social Democratic Initiative (NISMA) — which expressed willingness to support a Kurti-led government — reaching the required majority of 61 votes becomes possible. However, no agreement has been reached with all non-majority communities to date, leaving the formation of a new government uncertain.

In the 2021 elections, the Kurti government secured a comfortable majority with 58 deputies from VV, Lista Guxo and Alternativa, supplemented by 10 mandates from non-majority non-Serb communities — bringing the total to 68 votes, well above the simple majority required for decision-making.

However, even if VV manages to achieve the majority needed to form a government this time, it is unlikely to offer long-term stability or comfort.

In April 2026, the country is expected to elect a new president — a process that requires the presence of at least 80 deputies to be considered valid. Past experiences since the declaration of independence have shown that this moment often becomes a source of deep political crises. In the absence of a broader agreement between parties, the process could once again pose a significant challenge to institutional stability.

The issue of the presidency

Current President Vjosa Osmani’s term ends in April 2026. However, the difficult process that preceded her election in 2021 remains fresh in public memory. On April 3, 2021, two attempts to elect her in the Assembly failed due to the lack of a quorum of 80 deputies — a result of the boycott by PDK, AAK and Srpska Lista, as well as the absence of several LDK deputies, including former Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti. The lack of political agreement brought the country to the brink of extraordinary elections — the third within 18 months — if a new president had not been elected by the constitutional deadline of May 5, 2021.

A day later, on April 4, 2021, during the third attempt, a quorum was finally reached with the participation of 82 deputies. Osmani was elected president in the third round with 71 votes — becoming the fifth person to hold the office and the second woman president in Kosovo’s history. 

The political crisis around Osmani’s election was no exception. Since the declaration of independence in 2008, no presidential election process has been free of controversy. Two presidents resigned following Constitutional Court decisions; another was elected through a political agreement brokered by the U.S. ambassador — a process widely referred to as the “envelope” — while another was elected amid tensions and large-scale protests outside the Assembly.

Given the history of political crises surrounding the presidency and the current lack of agreement with opposition parties, VV is likely to face significant difficulty in securing the quorum of 80 deputies required to advance its candidate when the time comes to elect the next president. Although the Constitution states that the president should represent the unity and will of the citizens, the position has often served as a key bargaining chip in political negotiations to form governing coalitions. It is likely that, while VV is still in the negotiation phase, the presidency will emerge as one of the central points of discussion.

The absence of political consensus between VV and the other parties needed to meet the quorum increases the possibility that the next government will not be formed swiftly and may have a short-lived mandate.

Feature Image: Atdhe Mulla / K2.0

Want to support our journalism? Become a member of HIVE or consider making a donation. Learn more here.