In August 2024, Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti announced his intent to open the main bridge over Ibar River in the divided city of Mitrovica in northern Kosovo for vehicle traffic. Though two other nearby bridges are open for vehicles, this particular one has come to symbolize ethnic division in post-war Kosovo, as northern Mitrovica is predominantly inhabited by Kosovar Serbs, and the southern section is mostly Kosovar Albanians.

In the wake of NATO’s 1999 military intervention in Kosovo, French soldiers stationed on the bridge began checking crossers’ IDs. This began the process of the bridge becoming a venue of physical and symbolic division between Mitrovica’s north and south sections. That division was cemented in 2004, when KFOR, the NATO-led international peacekeeping force, barricaded the bridge following interethnic clashes that left 19 dead and many more wounded across Kosovo. 

Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, Serbs living in northern Mitrovica have frequently erected blockades on the bridge to stop crossings into the north. Despite the topic’s continued relevance, repeated efforts to reopen the bridge for vehicle traffic failed. 

The discussion about reopening the main bridge in Mitrovica for vehicle traffic pushed some Kosovo Serbs to protest, saying their security was “at stake” and that they had “been attacked as a people.” This speaks to pervasive tensions and deep mistrust between Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo government. 

Serbia has been very keen to fuel and tap into Kosovo Serbs’ fears in order to stoke tension in northern Kosovo. Moreover, the West has lent credence to these fears while not doing anything new or creative that might alter the underlying dynamics. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the U.S. and EU asked Kurti to not proceed with his reopening plan, citing concerns about the potential for renewed interethnic conflict. 

Yet Kurti has not backed down, declaring free movement of people and automobiles over the main bridge in Mitrovica to be a step toward peace. His pledge to open the bridge, in principle, is based on a state’s basic right to exert sovereignty within its borders. 

It is hard to argue with the notion that whether or not cars should be allowed to cross a bridge squarely in Kosovo’s territory is a matter for Kosovo’s government to decide. But despite the conventional idea of the state’s right to enforce a government decision in its territory, the debate about the Mitrovica bridge illustrates a much deeper hypocrisy around the practice of state sovereignty in international politics.  

The sovereignty myth 

Kurti’s government has been more assertive than its predecessors’ in dismantling Serbian parallel structures in northern Kosovo. His departure from previous, more incremental approaches coordinated with the U.S. and EU toward northern Kosovo, is rooted in his belief that sovereignty must be fully and independently performed in Kosovo’s territory. 

The decision to open the bridge for vehicle traffic manifests this conviction in a more state-centric strategy to the north and deemphasizes the West’s concerns. Kurti views U.S. and EU demands as overbearing and ultimately unhelpful in Kosovo’s struggle to advance its authority in areas mainly inhabited by Kosovo Serbs. 

Kurti understandably sees the extension of state authority in Serb-dominated north as a problem of “rule of law and constitutionality” and refers to Serb parallel structures as “criminal gangs financially and politically supported by Belgrade” aiming to undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty. But he overlooks a bigger underlying reality: there is no such thing as complete sovereignty in contemporary international politics. 

State sovereignty is constantly in flux and being renegotiated. Particularly in Kosovo’s case, when the very fact of the country’s independence is deeply entangled with international involvement and its security is at least partially upheld by NATO-led KFOR forces, invoking sovereignty in this narrow sense misses the bigger picture; the ideal sovereignty doesn’t match what it often looks like in practice. This reality, and Kosovo Serbs’ rejection of Kosovo government’s authority in the north makes Kurti’s rhetoric around the Mitrovica bridge unrealistic and problematic in three ways.

State sovereignty in retreat

First, the idea of state sovereignty has been corroded in recent decades by humanitarian intervention, which conditions non-interference in states’ domestic affairs on respect for human rights and ability to protect their own citizens. Additionally, globalization and multilateralism — seen in interdependence in trade, supply chains and proliferation of regional and global organizations — have weakened the conventional model of state sovereignty. 

The international intervention in Kosovo is partially a product of this normative change in how sovereignty is governed in international relations. In this respect, criticizing the West for abandoning norms for security interests is helpless in the face of constant rearrangement of alliances and redefinition of state sovereignty.

Renewed great power politics further challenges state sovereignty practice. The West still backs Ukraine’s right to decide its future in the EU and NATO, and defends — at least rhetorically — Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Yet the U.S. and biggest European players are reluctant to fully back Kosovo’s government in its efforts to extend its government’s reach over the whole country. While state sovereignty is frequently invoked in the Ukrainian case, there seems to be little tolerance for small, yet-to-be universally recognized states like Kosovo causing trouble in the name of sovereignty rights. 

Limited sovereignty is no exception  

Second, the ideal sovereignty in internal affairs — something created by Western European powers in the 20th century — has never existed in practice as imagined in theory. Most states have aspects of limited sovereignty and cede some control of certain parts of their territory or a policy area. Kosovo is no exception, as it relies on the West in the national security realm, both in terms of the foreign troop presence and in arms sales as it seeks to build up its military. Kosovo’s airspace is also controlled by NATO-KFOR forces in the absence of a mutual and final agreement with Serbia. 

It is also true that Kosovo Serbs have been instrumentalized in Serbia’s malign influence toward Kosovo’s statehood. However, it is not realistic to insist on extending Kosovo government’s full control over the north without devolving further self-government to Kosovo Serbs. 

The creation of an Association of Serb-Majority municipalities is no silver bullet for integrating the north Serb-dominated areas into Kosovo’s institutions. But if Kosovo continues to respond insufficiently to the West’s demands for creating some kind of Association of Serb-majority municipalities, it will most likely prolong the presence of the NATO-KFOR mission in its territory. Kosovo Serbs could continue fueling tensions in the north and make the case for partition more convincing to an international community tired of dealing with Kosovo and Serbia.

In this way, the international community won’t depart from Kosovo soon and pushing for more sovereignty in northern Kosovo Serb-dominated areas makes Kosovo an easy target to be blamed for any lack of progress in the EU-facilitated dialogue and continued involvement of Western actors in its internal affairs.

More for less?

Third, extending state sovereignty over the territory and population is not always a matter of principle but of effective power and legitimacy. Kosovo’s independence is recognized by over 100 U.N. members, but recognition is still far from universal and Kosovo struggles to enforce central decisions in the north. What is more, its security and territorial integrity is largely under NATO’s auspices. This puts Kosovo into a paradoxical situation. It strives to perform its statehood independent of EU and U.S. demands, yet simultaneously, its survival as a state is largely bound to Western support.

In these circumstances, if Kosovo doesn’t act in the north in line with U.S. and EU advice, it risks compromising its international standing in a bid to consolidate domestic sovereignty. Kosovo’s government might want to risk its integration in international organizations for more domestic sovereignty, but it should be honest with its citizens about the benefits and disadvantages involved if so.

Putting northern Kosovo Serb majority areas under Kosovo government’s tighter control arguably strengthens Kosovo’s internal sovereignty, but it endangers Western support for Kosovo’s integration into NATO and EU, keeping Kosovo in the realms of a de-facto state without full international recognition. Framing the question around opening the bridge in Mitrovica as a matter of state sovereignty may be beneficial to Kurti’s bid to win elections in February 2025, but it won’t move Kosovo’s statehood out of the contestation zone in international politics. 

Norms of state sovereignty are continuously challenged and compromised by what political scientist and former diplomat Stephen Krasner calls the organized hypocrisy of international politics. The debate around the opening of the main bridge in Mitrovica is a telling example of this sanctimony. How Kosovo navigates these challenges going forward will be critical to its future. 

Feature image: Atdhe Mulla / K2.0.

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