As Kosovo prepares to form a new government, a crucial question looms: How will it recalibrate its foreign policy in an era of geopolitical upheaval? 

Kosovo’s international standing remains challenging. Nearly two years of punitive EU measures have strained relations between the EU and Kosovo, and ties with the U.S. are increasingly unstable. There are also unresolved questions about how to engage with the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, a key friction point between Kosovo, the EU and the U.S..

Despite these shifts, Kosovo’s political parties continue to craft foreign policy agendas frozen in time, anchored in outdated priorities more relevant to 2008 than today’s turbulent global landscape. In a world where multilateralism is in crisis, the parties proposed ambitious foreign policy plans. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) announced its intent to seek recognition from two-thirds of U.N. member states, while the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) pledged to fast-track NATO membership at a pace that could rival Sweden’s and Finland’s. Vetëvendosje (VV), meanwhile, aims to close EU accession talks by 2030. 

Such aspirations have long remained beyond reach, even when Kosovo had strong Western backing, raising doubts about their feasibility in the current geopolitical climate. As such, party programs reveal a disconnect from reality, while parties lack the political courage to address the multifaceted challenges awaiting the new government. 

These goals also ignore the shifting diplomatic landscape — where Western support is no longer guaranteed — and overlook practical steps to escape EU isolation. As Europe faces mounting uncertainty and navigates a massive transatlantic storm, the question is: how will we weather the turbulence ahead?

Rather than crafting adaptive strategies, parties remain entrenched in oversimplified approaches. One approach can be seen in the rigid stance adopted by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, leader of VV. This perspective prioritizes sovereignty and self-reliance but neglects tending to necessary strategic alliances.

Over the nearly two years these measures have been in place, Kosovo maintained high-level political ties with Brussels, but these engagements largely revolved around the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue or occurred in multilateral settings. While Kosovo became part of the EU’s Growth Plan, albeit tied to progress in the dialogue, EU-funded projects have been hard hit. 

Unless the sanctions are lifted, they will continue to shadow Kosovo at every critical step of the EU integration path. They also stand to directly impact Kosovo’s ability to mitigate the impact of the suspension of U.S. foreign aid, the full consequences of which are still unknown. This makes it vital to engage with Poland and Denmark, holders of the Council of the European Union presidency in 2025, to secure Kosovo a spot on the agenda. 

There should also be an effort to strengthen bilateral ties with Germany and France to leverage their considerable political influence and push for lifting the punitive EU measures. The European Parliament draft annual report assessing Kosovo’s situation and its progress toward EU membership, calling for the immediate removal of EU sanctions imposed on Kosovo in June 2023, can be a starting point. 

Unfortunately, the European Council’s agenda could be overshadowed by the EU’s urgent challenges, most notably the ongoing Ukraine peace negotiations. But timing is everything. The European Council, notorious for its rigorous decision-making, presents two critical windows for this process: June and December. Whether Kosovo can capitalize on these moments will determine the pace of EU integration and Kosovo’s future relations with the EU. 

Kosovo missed the opportunity to jump on the same train to candidate status with the Eastern Trio — Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia — and Bosnia and Herzegovina during a brief window for EU enlargement in 2022, triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This mainly stems from the EU’s lack of political will to advance Kosovo’s candidacy, compounded by opposition from the five non-recognizing member states and developments in the dialogue. 

Under these circumstances, progressing to the next stage of EU integration — candidate status — remains a significant challenge. The new government must demonstrate its commitment to advancing this process and forge strategic alliances within EU institutions in Brussels and across member state capitals. The goal should be to strategically and incrementally pave the way for Kosovo to stand on equal footing with other countries in the enlargement package, and this will indeed be a long stretch. 

The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue: the most contentious foreign policy issue 

The EU-facilitated dialogue with Serbia remains the defining challenge through which Kosovo’s strategic partners view Kosovo and its government. Despite years of negotiations, progress remains minimal. Obstacles include the EU’s limited leverage, Serbia’s reluctance to resolve an issue that has granted it significant sway over Kosovo’s foreign policy and internal affairs, primarily but not only through Srpska Lista and Kosovo political elites’ inability to articulate and advance Kosovo’s strategic interests. 

In EU and U.S. eyes, the unresolved question of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM) is at the very core of this deadlock, obstructing dialogue and Kosovo’s EU and broader ambitions. Kosovo’s politics remain sharply divided over the ASM, revealing a complex web of strategic silences and carefully calculated rhetoric. 

On one side, Kurti fiercely advocates for the extension of sovereignty in northern Kosovo while tactfully avoiding any mention of the ASM, despite having committed to it in the 2023 Brussels Agreement. 

On the other side, opposition parties, mainly LDK and PDK, which agreed to the ASM in 2013 and 2015, face a dilemma of their own. Cornered by Kurti’s triumphalist rhetoric about the north, they have opted for silence, fearing alienating an electorate largely opposed to the ASM. Criticism or alternative proposals are off the table, as either approach risks backlash from the EU and U.S.. Instead, opposition parties have crafted an image of pragmatic compliance, subtly suggesting that had they been in power, implementing the ASM would have been less contentious. Yet, their track record from 2013 to 2020 tells a different story: years in charge without the political will or courage to push the ASM forward.

This calculated avoidance on both sides begs a crucial question. If neither political camp is willing to engage with the ASM, how will this issue ever be addressed? Or is the prevailing strategy merely a game of political circumvention, with each side buying time and deflecting responsibility without a strategic vision for the future?

Delaying the inevitable debate about the ASM will not alter the reality that strategizing for the EU-facilitated dialogue is imperative. Kosovo cannot afford further instability while the West and multilateralism navigate the transatlantic rift opened by the change of administration in the U.S.. The shifting geopolitical landscape risks eroding the political will and capital of the U.S. and the EU to shoulder Kosovo’s unfinished statehood. The longer this issue remains unresolved, the greater the diplomatic strain with Kosovo’s strategic partners. 

The new governing coalition must be strategically prepared for what lies ahead. A passive approach or shifting blame will not resolve one of Kosovo’s most pressing diplomatic challenges. Equally, complete compliance for the sake of “constructive” engagement with the West has proven ineffective, just as defiance driven by a lack of political courage has stalled progress. Local ownership and political leadership are essential. 

The Trump administration and Kosovo

Kosovo’s political elites have largely ignored the elephant in the room — the shifting global landscape following the change in the U.S. administration and comments from U.S. officials at the February 2025 Munich Security Conference, which upended transatlantic relations. The Trump administration’s challenge to the multilateral, rules-based order that underpins the EU’s foreign policy and security strategies in its neighborhood and beyond adds a new layer of uncertainty. This shift’s consequences will be particularly profound for countries like Kosovo, whose security and stability have long been anchored in Western support.

Instead of recognizing the crisis of multilateralism as a wake-up call to solidify Kosovo’s international position, domestic discourse remains stuck in partisan attacks and online feuds, mainly with the opposition trying to capitalize and gain political ground by invoking Richard Grenell’s posts calling Kurti an anti-Western leader, squandering valuable time that should be spent on strategic diplomacy and statecraft. Rather than formulating a proactive response, political debate has focused on using prior animosity with the Trump administration to discredit Kurti. 

While Kosovo is unlikely to rank high on Trump’s foreign policy agenda, Grenell, Trump’s envoy for “special missions” and former envoy to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, is a wild card. He has hinted at a potential return to the Balkans and has made no secret of his opposition to Kurti’s leadership. He also signalled solid support for Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić amid anti-regime protests. 

Should Grenell reemerge as a key player, Kosovo could face renewed diplomatic pressure, potentially replicating the 2020 political crisis. ​​Back then, discussions of a controversial land swap, albeit proposed by local leaders, dominated the agenda, ultimately leading Kurti’s first government to fall. As a result, the U.S. had a more compliant leader with whom to conclude the Washington Accords in September 2020. However, today’s circumstances are starkly different than 2020, when Kosovo could count on EU and member state support to counterbalance U.S. pressure. 

With a divided EU, lack of EU and U.S. alignment on Ukraine and waning Western political capital in support of Kosovo’s statehood, Kosovo risks a broader diplomatic sidelining and faces a more challenging diplomatic landscape than ever before. The West’s fragmentation means that the political capital to advocate for Kosovo on the global stage is simply not there. Multilateralism itself is being contested, and Kosovo must confront the reality that traditional pathways to international legitimacy are no longer viable. 

In this shifting environment, a reactive approach will no longer suffice. Kosovo must rethink its diplomatic strategy and seek creative avenues to strengthen its position on the world stage. 

The new government must confront this reality head-on. Strategic engagement, diplomatic pragmatism and proactive policymaking are no longer optional. They are essential to ensuring that Kosovo does not drift further into geopolitical irrelevance.

Feature image: Majlinda Hoxha / K2.0.

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