On July 21, the Kosovo Assembly failed to convene for the 50th time. Since the first constitutive session following the parliamentary elections of February 9, MPs have gathered every 48 hours solely to obstruct the formation of government.
From the first session held on April 15 to the jubilee session on July 21, an average of 12 minutes has passed per sitting, from the moment the sessions were opened by the chairperson to their closure, as can be seen on the official channel of the Assembly of Kosovo on YouTube. These 12 minutes across 50 sessions effectively make up 10 hours of work; it accounts for one whole day plus two hours and 50 minutes, not even a day and a half’s worth in total.
During this one working day, plus two hours and 50 minutes, each member of the Assembly of Kosovo has received a basic monthly salary of 1,859 euros. In addition to the basic wage, each MP receives a supplement according to their years of work experience. This supplement ranges from a minimum of 4.65 euros, as is the case for the youngest MP of this legislature, Sala Jashari from the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), to 302 euros for MP Bylbyl Sokoli from Vetëvendosje (VV), who appears to have the most years of formal work experience among his colleagues.
Taking these allowances into account, the minimum monthly salary of an MP ranges from 1,859 euros to 2,161.09 euros per month; there are, however, those who have reported zero years of work experience, such as Edona Llalloshi from VV.
For the three months they have spent commuting back and forth to the Assembly, an MP has received a minimum of 5,577 euros and up to 6,483.27 euros in income, for less than one and a half days of work over three months. By the end of July, the assembly will have spent over 800,000 euros on MPs’ salaries. And the result? Zero.
The basic salary of MPs would not be problematic if, after taking their oath, they were dedicated to work and fulfilling their promises. Meanwhile, the citizens who voted for them live with average salaries three times lower than their representatives and face price increases, energy costs, air pollution, and a well-being that has not shown any substantial improvement compared to four years ago. Over 800,000 euros, however, have been spent in vain on 120 deputies and an institution that has not made any decisions or approved any draft laws or international agreements for more than three months.
A few weeks ago, the acting Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, said that the formation of government is not an emergency and that the wait is more of a media matter than one of any real necessity. But what is Kosovo losing by not constituting its institutions?
Let us mention just some of the most significant losses.
Around 111 draft laws have not been processed
At the last regular meeting of the Government, held on January 31, 2025, the Draft Laws Program for 2025–2027 was approved. This program contains 111 draft laws to be approved by the Government and the Assembly — 95 of which were expected to be approved by the end of 2025, and 42 by the end of July 2025.
These include the draft law on amending and supplementing the Labor Law, which aims to improve workers’ rights and more effectively regulate labor relations. This law has not been updated since 2010, and although it has been part of the legislative agenda since 2023, it remained unprocessed by the last VV government.
Among these priorities is a draft to amend the Law on Safety and Health at Work, which is necessary to improve working conditions, especially in high-risk sectors such as construction. In the absence of the adoption and implementation of these laws, the situation on the ground is worrying. In the construction sector alone, 10 workers have lost their lives in the workplace this year. On July 21, three construction workers lost their lives in the workplace on one day alone.
The approval of the Civil Code draft law is now overdue. Its enactment would establish a legal framework to regulate civil relations between citizens, enhancing legal certainty in economic transactions and family affairs. The proposed Social Assistance Scheme draft law was also intended for approval, enabling a review of welfare provisions received by the country’s poorest and most marginalized. In the meantime, the draft law on energy would have established new rules for the sector, directly impacting the security of energy supplies to citizens and businesses.
In addition to these draft laws, the failure to form a government prevents any amendments to the central budget so that this year’s budgetary needs can be met. It also prevents the approval of budgets for municipalities that have failed to approve their own financial accounts on time, as is the case for the municipality of Prishtina. Without a functioning Assembly, changes cannot be made to the Law on Budget, which means these processes remain blocked, hindering the financing of basic services for citizens.
The Assembly is also responsible for appointing members to the boards of independent institutions, whose mandates have already begun to expire.
The lack of a functioning Assembly means delays in key reforms and a threat to the well-being and lives of citizens. Yet, the formation of government is not an emergency? If so, why are so many new draft laws included in the legislative agenda?
Limited access to EU funds
Kosovo remains under the European Union (EU) measures imposed in June 2023. Although the EU has stated that it has begun a gradual lifting of these measures, over the past two years, Kosovo has suffered significant financial losses. More than 600 million euros have been suspended or postponed indefinitely in important development projects, including in infrastructure, energy, environment, and the public sector. Without these funds, digitalization, infrastructure modernization, and the energy transition have been disrupted for decades to come. This will have a long-term impact on the country’s socio-economic development and Euro-Atlantic integration. In the absence of established institutions, dialogue with the EU and lobbying in European capitals for the complete lifting of these measures is non-existent.
Despite these EU measures, Kosovo has been granted access to the EU Growth Plan, enjoying equal treatment with other countries in the region. The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans foresees investments through loans and grants of up to six billion euros during the period 2024–2027. This plan aims to accelerate the harmonization of socio-economic conditions between countries of the Balkans and those of the EU, aiming to achieve EU membership for countries of the Western Balkans as soon as possible. Western Balkan countries are obligated to adopt the Reform Agenda, which will serve as the basis for receiving EU financing through the Growth Plan.
This agenda was also approved by the Government of Kosovo in October 2024. It aims to serve as a strategic roadmap for improving governance, developing infrastructure, diversifying the economy, securing energy supply, reforming the labor market, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting social inclusion, in addition to reforming public administration and digitizing public services and the economy.
The implementation of this agenda, which is based on five pillars — governance reforms, digital and green transformation, private sector development, human capital development, and the rule of law — is expected to cost over 882 million euros. In June, Serbia received an initial financing of 51.7 million euros in loans and is expected to receive an additional 59 million euros in grants. In March, the EU disbursed €52.2 million to North Macedonia, including €24.5 million for the state budget to support reforms and €28 million for infrastructure projects. That same month, Albania received €64.5 million from the EU, with €30 million as a loan for reform support and €34.5 million allocated for infrastructure projects through the Balkan Investment Facility (BIF).
Since Kosovo still does not have a functioning parliament, the Growth Plan remains unapproved, and these crucial funds remain blocked. The suspension of this funding will cause long-term damage, as it will slow down structural reforms, economic development, and the country’s integration into the European single market.
Suspended agreements
In August 2023, Kosovo and the United States of America (US) signed the Agreement on Security Measures for Classified Information. This agreement enables Kosovo to exchange classified information with the US and to protect this data in accordance with international security standards. For Kosovo, this means strengthening its capacity to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, advancing the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) toward NATO standards, and deepening its involvement in regional and Euro-Atlantic security cooperation.
In the field of security and defense, this agreement was expected to be the first step in a broader cooperation framework. On May 17, 2025, the outgoing Minister of Defense, Ejup Maqedonci, announced the signing of the Defense Framework Agreement for the period 2025–2030, which was expected to take place at the Department of Defense in Washington on June 13, 2025. This “historic” agreement, in Maqedonci’s own words, would be the first defense framework agreement signed between the Ministry of Defense of Kosovo and the U.S. Department of Defense, aiming to develop local defense capacities and bring Kosovo closer to NATO structures.
Maqedonci traveled to the U.S. on an official visit in June, but the agreement was not signed. The only public communication about the visit remains a post by the U.S. Embassy in Kosovo, which Maqedonci shared, promoting his meetings at the U.S. Department of Defense. According to available information, the agreement is waiting for the government to be formed before it can be signed.
The lack of functional institutions also affects diplomatic relations, where Kosovo — as a state which is still only partially recognized — needs more than ever a full-fledged foreign minister, among others, to advance its international subjectivity. This becomes even more important in light of the current global landscape, one marked by uncertainty and interconnected crises, where clarity and institutional stability are required from Kosovo’s diplomatic positioning.
This parliamentary sadism is not limited to the 800,000 euros spent on 10 hours of failure, but extends to the long-term damage it is causing to the public’s trust in institutions and democracy itself. When citizens see that their vote is not translated into an oath — let alone representation or decision-making — they begin to abandon the belief that politics can change their reality.
The dysfunction of the Assembly is not a temporary crisis; it is a dangerous message that normalizes irresponsibility and erodes the legitimacy of the democratic system from within. And when trust is broken, no international agreements, reform agendas, or European funds can easily restore it.
Feature image: K2.0
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