The preliminary results of the general elections, held on February 9, clearly show that victory and defeat in elections can have different levels and meanings. So, who won these elections?
The immediate and formal answer is simple: Vetëvendosje (VV) won, securing first place with just over 40% of the votes. However, the discussion about the results doesn’t end there.
The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) increased its vote share compared to the 2021 elections. According to the most current results, PDK secured 22.05% of the votes, an increase of 5.04 percentage points, positioning it as the second-largest party. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which came in third, experienced a nearly identical increase in percentage points. With a low result of 12.73% in 2021, LDK gained 4.91 percentage points in these elections, reaching 17.64%.
These results need to be viewed from multiple perspectives. To determine who won and who did not, it is essential to analyze the political dynamics among the competing parties before, during and after the election campaign. Such an analysis can help identify significant victories, if any, and provide insights into potential future steps for political parties.
In this regard, one of the most significant victories is the election result itself. While VV secured a majority of 50.02% in the 2021 elections, these results clearly demonstrated that even in a democracy with stable institutions, Kosovo can still be at risk from one-party rule. Such a government may attempt to “capture” state institutions — as seen in the case of the law on the Prosecutorial Council — and interfere in decision-making processes within independent institutions outside the political system.
Kosovo has passed important tests when its democracy has been challenged. Its institutions have proven resilient and capable of addressing these challenges. Two key examples illustrate this: the distortion of voters’ will in the 2010 elections, when results were falsified, and the Constitutional Court’s role in helping to overcome obstacles to stabilizing institutions. Nonetheless, democracy cannot be taken for granted.
In this regard, the election results indicate that citizens collectively demand party pluralism in institutions, democracy and transparency in decision-making and developmental policies for the future. Therefore, the return to a more pluralistic political balance is a victory for Kosovo.
The campaign made the essential difference
The clearest evidence of this return to balance can be seen in the election results themselves. Albin Kurti and his party, VV, were penalized for the arrogance they displayed during their time in government, particularly during the election campaign. This arrogance was evident in their delayed publication of their program, which was only released shortly before the elections, its lack of detail and their attacks on other parties.
VV was also penalized for its four-year governance, which failed to make a significant impact on key sectors affecting citizens’ lives and well-being, such as healthcare, education and overall living conditions. As a result, its vote share declined.
Unlike VV, PDK and LDK saw an increase in votes. These two parties and their leaders took a different approach from Kurti and VV in addressing daily challenges, particularly in how they conducted their election campaigns. The causes and factors behind their vote increase are among the key lessons from these elections.
VV and Kurti ran an electoral campaign focused more on polarization, ridiculing opponents and attacking prosecutors and the media than on presenting the party’s program and goals for the next governing mandate.
PDK and LDK, on the other hand, focused entirely on presenting their programs. As a result, the election campaign unfolded in two qualitatively different registers. On one side, PDK and LDK engaged in rational discussions about governance, while on the other, VV appealed to emotions — such as fear of a return to the past and tensions with Serbia. In doing so, VV appealed more to citizens’ unconsciousness and imagination than to their reason and needs.
This fundamental difference elegantly highlights the political transformation that Kosovo is undergoing. In retrospect, February 9 may mark the beginning of a new political trajectory for the country, as the only parties that gained votes were the two that chose to campaign differently — with a new approach, a fresh image and a higher quality of political discourse. The increase in their support was not insignificant.
Both of these political options were led by a different kind of political representative than the ones we are used to seeing. Memli Krasniqi, Bedri Hamza and Lumir Abdixhiku are political leaders of the present, deriving their legitimacy from contemporary governance rather than the past, particularly the 1990s. In contrast, Kurti and Ramush Haradinaj, chairman of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), remain figures of the past. This marks a qualitative change.
Throughout the election campaign, discussions about Hamza and Abdixhiku often emphasized their professional backgrounds — both economists by profession. In contrast, Kurti was addressed by citizens as “Albin baba,” and he himself portrayed himself as a father figure to the people — an element of megalomania that neither Hamza nor Abdixhiku exhibited. The success of Hamza and Abdixhiku lies in their ability to generate curiosity and support for their political opinions, a highly valuable achievement for Kosovo. A similar approach was seen in the 2021 elections with Enver Hoxhaj leading PDK and Avdullah Hoti leading LDK. At that time, however, amid the political cacophony, it seemed that citizens were unwilling to engage with these alternatives. This time, the outcome was different.
Opportunity for political transformation
If we examine the results of the exit poll conducted by the research company UBO Consulting and published on “Debat Plus” on TV Dukagjini on February 9 after the polls closed, we find interesting insights from the comparison and analysis of various variables through cross-tabulation of the election results.
Both PDK and LDK saw significant increases in support from women and young voters compared to 2021. While 61.6% of all women who participated in the 2021 elections voted for VV, this percentage dropped to 48.7% in 2025. Meanwhile, support for PDK among women voters increased from 13.9% to 21.3%; for LDK, it went from 16.3% to 20.5%.
A similar trend can be seen among younger voters, particularly in the 18-21 and 22-34 age groups, in which both PDK and LDK experienced notable growth. These are important indicators that PDK and LDK carefully analyzed the 2021 results and adjusted their approach accordingly.
Analysis of the same percentages and cross-tabulations from UBO Consulting reveals that PDK and LDK’s focus on their programs led citizens to perceive these parties differently. When asked about the main factor influencing their vote, 60.9% of VV voters stated that the leader was the primary reason.
Contrastingly, this percentage was significantly lower among PDK voters (28.8%) and LDK voters (20.3%). Additionally, 32% of PDK voters and 36.8% of LDK voters cited the party’s program as their main reason for voting, compared to only 22.3% of VV voters who considered this factor decisive.
The way parties design their campaigns and focus their political discourse also shapes citizens’ orientation and political thinking. In this regard, PDK and LDK have done valuable work during the campaign by presenting a different approach to policymaking. Although initially criticized as insufficient or misguided, this strategy is proving to have been the right one.
The final election result, if not deconstructed, could lead to a different takeaway. It is easy to say that the opposition parties failed since VV won again with a large percentage and difference in the vote.
Here, the expectations each individual may have had must also be considered, especially how realistic those expectations were. To expect a party with over 50% of the vote in 2021 to fall to 25% after four years of government is to expect an anomaly. It should not be forgotten that this 10-percentage point drop in the VV vote was neither easily achieved nor easily expected. It happened for two reasons: the four-year government, which did not even come close to meeting the expectations of the citizens, and the return of PDK and LDK as real political options.
However, the greatest victory in these elections does not belong to any single party — it is a victory for the health of Kosovo’s democracy. Since no party appears able to form a government alone, politics is returning to the necessity of cooperation, agreement and compromise. Moreover, with no single political group dominating, the Assembly’s capacity to hold the government accountable is strengthened.
These results also demonstrate that all the parties have, at different times, been held accountable for their governance mistakes. Each of them should take these lessons to heart and avoid repeating the same errors.
This presents an opportunity for Kosovo’s political transformation — one that begins with the reform of political parties.
This is only the first phase of the transformation. The second phase — forming the government — and the third phase — governing — are far more crucial for meaningful party reform, especially governance itself. Yet, these are ongoing processes that cannot be fully addressed at this moment.
Feature image: Majlinda Hoxha / K2.0.
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