The constitution of the Kosovo Assembly has once again hit a snag, following positive signals during the session on August 26, when, after nearly 60 attempts, the deputies of the Kosovo Assembly elected Dimal Basha, from the ranks of the Vetëvendosje (VV), as speaker. Basha’s election came after the failure of several previous VV candidacies, including former Minister of Justice Albulena Haxhiu, who, since April 15, had not received enough votes over 50 consecutive attempts. In the August 26 session, which marked a semi-successful step toward the constitution of the Assembly, Basha was elected with 73 votes in favor and 30 abstentions.
But this step, which was expected to conclude the process of constituting the Assembly and pave the way for the formation of a new government — a long political impasse that followed the February 9 elections — led to a new obstacle regarding the election of deputy speakers from non-majority communities. In the August 26 session, the vote for deputy speakers from non-majority communities was divided into two packages: one for candidates from non-Serb communities and the other for candidates from the Serb community. While the deputy speaker from non-Serb communities was elected, the candidates from the Serb community failed to secure the necessary votes. Again, this risks leading the situation back into a political and constitutional crisis.
Political parties can prolong the issue of electing the deputy speaker from the Serb community until September 17, which is the constitutional deadline for constituting the Assembly, although the Constitutional Court (CC) has not clearly clarified what happens if this process is not completed within that timeframe.
The delay in the process of constituting the Assembly is being facilitated by all the political parties in the country, as none of them has the necessary numbers to form a new government on their own. VV, which has the first right to form government, having received the largest number of votes in the February 9 elections, failed to secure the majority needed to govern alone, and their initial attempts to achieve this majority in cooperation with other parties have so far not been successful.
Although they have had several months to unblock this process and to form institutions — either by paving the way for a new government or for new elections — political parties do not appear to prefer either option and have instead chosen to remain in an endless cycle of blaming each other.
Deadlock from day one
From the first constitutive session on April 15, it was clear that the path to forming new institutions would be complicated. What was expected to be a formal procedure — the swearing in of 120 new deputies and the voting of the Assembly presidency without any obstacles — turned into a political and legal mess.
The first issue was the not voting of the report of the Commission for the Verification of Quorum and Mandates (CVQM). This commission, composed of representatives from all parties, was tasked with verifying the 120 mandates certified by the Central Election Commission (CEC) before the deputies were sworn in. However, the report was not supported by the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). According to them, the main reason was the lack of official resignations from the then-acting Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, and 10 ministers of his government, who had already won mandates as MPs.
Kurti and the ministers stated that they had submitted their resignations to the previous speaker of the Assembly, Glauk Konjufca from VV, on April 15, the day of the session. However, the form of the resignation was contested not only by other parties, but also by civil society organizations, which argued that the official procedure, submission through the Secretariat of the Assembly, had not been followed.
VV and other parties blamed each other for the failure of the session. VV accused the other parties of blocking the process, while the latter insisted that Kurti and his ministers were violating the Constitution by simultaneously holding mandates as deputies and executive positions in the government. This uncertainty over the resignations became the first source of political conflict among those who had secured enough votes to be part of the next legislature of the Assembly.
As a result, the session was interrupted, while its chair, the oldest deputy, Avni Dehari from VV, announced that they would seek the interpretation of President Vjosa Osmani on how to proceed, describing the situation as unprecedented. President Osmani stated that the Assembly should continue with the next session within 48 hours, as foreseen by its Rules of Procedure.
On April 19, in the third session, the deputies voted on the CVQM report and took the oath of office, but only after Kurti and the other ministers elected as deputies had submitted their resignations through official channels. They have continued, however, to hold their executive positions in the government, contrary to the laws in force.
Although the report was eventually approved, another deadlock followed, lasting months. Haxhiu, proposed by VV for Speaker of the Assembly, was not elected in over 50 consecutive sessions, as MPs from other parties considered her a “divisive figure.” Meanwhile, VV refused to propose another candidate.
The reason this position became so contested is more closely tied to the fact that none of the political parties hold the necessary numbers to form a government, yet none appears ready to head to new elections. As a result, all steps in the process of constituting the Assembly — from the approval of the report to the voting for the Speaker and Deputy Speakers — which in the past were largely treated as formal procedures, have now transformed into tools that allow for a prolonged deadlock.
Thus, since April 15, the constitution of the Assembly remained hostage to continual sessions every 48 hours, until a Constitutional Court decision on August 8 ruled that VV could propose a candidate only three times.
Following this ruling, three resigned government ministers were nominated in August: Donika Gërvalla, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Arbërie Nagavci, Minister of Education; and Hekuran Murati, Minister of Finance. None of them received the necessary votes. PDK requested that VV nominate an MP who had not been part of the government. As a result, VV put forward Basha, whom PDK did not support in the first nomination but backed in the second. Meanwhile, LDK did not participate in the vote.
How did the Constitutional Court get involved?
During this period, the Constitutional Court became the most important institution after the Assembly, as successive deadlocks often resulted from violations of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure. As a result, there were several occasions when this process found itself in unprecedented situations, and it was unclear how to proceed. In these circumstances, deputies turned twice to the Constitutional Court (GjK) and once to President Osmani. The current situation suggests that the GjK may once again be required to unblock the process of electing the deputy speaker from the Serbian community.
The first time that several PDK and AAK deputies addressed the Constitutional Court, their complaint concerned a proposal by the Speaker of the Assembly, Dehari.
On May 1, during the eighth continuation of the constitutive session, Dehari proposed forming a secret ballot committee for the election of the Speaker of the Assembly. According to VV, if the vote were secret, Haxhiu would secure the necessary votes to be elected Speaker of the Assembly and the process would be unblocked.
Dehari justified this proposal by referring to a 2014 Constitutional Court judgment and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, emphasizing that secret balloting with physical ballots was the most appropriate way to unblock the process and enable the constitution of the Assembly. According to Naim Jakaj from the Kosovo Law Institute (KLI), however, the 2014 judgment does not specifically recommend secret balloting in the election of the Speaker, but only mentions it as one possible method of voting in the Assembly.
Claiming that Dehari’s proposal constituted a constitutional violation, AAK deputies — supported by several deputies from PDK and LDK — submitted a request for the assessment of its constitutionality.
On June 26, the Constitutional Court issued a judgment stating that the constitutive session of the Assembly should be concluded within 30 days with the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speakers, and that the scenario of the first constitutive session should be followed. According to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, this scenario includes four steps: the formation of the Temporary Committee for the Verification of Quorum and Mandates, the swearing in of the deputies, the election of the Speaker and the election of the Deputy Speakers.
Despite this, Dehari continued to demand a secret ballot and multiple occasions interrupted sessions. As a consequence, deputies addressed the Constitutional Court on July 3 for a second time, when PDK and AAK again requested clarification on four issues: Dehari’s proposal for members of the Secret Ballot Committee, the vote on this committee, its own vote and the arbitrary interruption of the session after the committee’s rejection.
On August 8, the Constitutional Court issued its next ruling, stating that a new Speaker of the Assembly must be elected through open voting within 30 days, and that the same candidate was allowed no more than three nominations. This ruling made it clear that VV could not indefinitely nominate Haxhiu as a candidate for Speaker of the Assembly.
With the publication of the full ruling on August 18, the 30-day deadline began, ending on September 17. During August, VV nominated three resigned government ministers: Donika Gërvalla, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Arbërie Nagavci, Minister of Education; and Hekuran Murati, Minister of Finance — none of whom received the necessary votes. Following PDK’s request to nominate a VV MP who had not been part of the government, Dimal Basha was elected Speaker of the Assembly 22 days before the end of this deadline.
Meanwhile, in September, the Constitutional Court is expected to clarify what happens if the Assembly is not constituted by September 17. This clarification will follow a request that President Osmani submitted to the Constitutional Court on July 22 regarding the issue.
But, to further complicate the situation, on August 5, Osmani withdrew her request from the Constitutional Court, citing the appointment of Serbian judge Radomir Llaban as rapporteur for the case. Osmani’s reasoning for this withdrawal remains unclear, since decisions in the Constitutional Court are made by a majority vote of the constitutional judges. However, despite the withdrawal, the Constitutional Court is still expected to respond to the issue she had raised.
In the meantime, the deputies may address the Constitutional Court a third time, this time through the Serbian List (LS), which has already announced that it will file a complaint. This relates to the voting method for deputy speakers from non-majority communities, which should constitute the final step toward the constitution of the Assembly.
The (un)constitutional election of deputy speaker from the Serbian community
According to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, voting for the deputy speakers takes place in two packages: the first package includes the three deputy speakers from the largest political parties, while the second package includes the two deputy speakers from non-majority communities. Candidates for deputy speakers from non-majority groups must be proposed by a majority of representatives of those communities.
In the session of August 26, following the election of Basha as Speaker, the three deputy speakers from the largest political parties were elected: Albulena Haxhiu from VV, Vlora Çitaku from PDK, and Kujtim Shala from LDK. Subsequently, Elbert Krasniqi from the non-majority party New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo (IRDK) requested that the vote for the deputy speaker of the non-majority non-Serb communities be held separately from the vote for the deputy speaker of the Serbian community.
Basha made this possible by conducting separate voting. LS, which secured 9 of the 10 seats reserved for the Serbian community, nominated Slavko Simić, while Nenad Rašić, from the For Freedom, Justice and Survival (ZSPO) party, which won one mandate, nominated himself. This deviation from the package vote and Rašić’s self-nomination for the post of deputy speaker violated the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.
In the session of August 26, however, voting continued, and Simić failed to secure the necessary 61 votes in three rounds. The deputies of VV voted against him, as did some from PDK, while LDK did not participate in the vote. Basha stated that the candidacy of the same person is allowed only three times, referring to the August 8 Constitutional Court judgment, which stipulates that a candidate can be nominated only three times for Speaker of the Assembly — an interpretation that was also applied to the election of the Deputy Speaker.
After the failure to elect Simić, Basha proposed drawing lots to select the candidate, a procedure provided for by the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure only in cases where the relevant community does not propose any candidate. This step also contradicted the Rules of Procedure, as LS had already proposed its candidate, Simić, who was not elected, and then refused to propose another.
The same practice continued in the session of August 28, when the vote for the deputy speaker from the Serbian community was again held by lot, and none of the SL candidates managed to secure the necessary votes. Rašić was also selected by lot for the vote but failed to receive the required support for the second time.
During the sessions of August 26 and 28, VV voted against the SL candidates and in favor of Rašić. In the last session, however, LDK did not participate in the vote, PDK abstained, and AAK was not present. Since each candidate from the Serbian community can only appear on the ballot three times, there are now three SL deputies remaining who can be included in the draw in the next session within 48 hours.
Meanwhile, Rašić has only one more chance. VV has called for him to be voted in, but even if he receives the votes, as a candidate who does not have the support of the parliamentary majority of the Serb group, the entire process remains at risk of being overturned by the Constitutional Court.
In a press conference following the August 28 session, SL stated that they would file a complaint with the Constitutional Court. However, 10 MPs are required to submit a complaint, and SL is one short. In the August 26 session, Adem Hoxha from AAK voted for Simić and was subsequently expelled from the AAK parliamentary group. If Hoxha joins the SL parliamentary group, this would give them the necessary numbers to file a complaint with the Constitutional Court.
Thus, the Constitutional Court remains a key institution for resolving this impasse.
What’s next?
The next session is scheduled for Saturday, August 30.
Most likely, political parties will continue to use the final step of the Assembly’s constitutive process to prolong the institutional deadlock until the constitutional deadline of September 17. What happens if the Assembly is not constituted by this deadline remains unclear. This issue is expected to be clarified by the Constitutional Court in response to President Osmani’s request, in which she asked what occurs if the Assembly is not established within 30 days.
However, even if the issue of the deputy speaker from the Serb community is resolved, this does not guarantee the formation of a new government, as VV does not have the necessary numbers to form a majority government.
In the last general elections on February 9, VV won 42.3% of the vote, securing 48 seats. To form a government, at least 61 votes are needed, which means that VV is still 13 votes short.
One of the most likely scenarios for VV is to secure support from the 10 seats held by non-Serb, non-majority communities, as well as from the three deputies of the Social Democratic Initiative. Initially, these deputies had expressed their willingness to support a government led by Kurti, which would technically make a majority of 61 votes achievable. However, Duda Balje from the Bosniak community has stated that she does not support VV and has no agreement with them, emphasizing that she does not see herself as part of the VV team. Meanwhile, despite ongoing talks, the possibility of an agreement with NISMA has faded, as one of the party’s demand was the position of Speaker of the Assembly. As a result, securing a simple majority of 61 votes remains uncertain.
Even if VV manages to form a new government, without a larger majority than what is required to form government, processes that need more than 61 votes will remain blocked. A major challenge is also expected in the election of a new president in April, when President Osmani’s mandate ends. This process requires 80 MPs to be present — a number that seems difficult for VV to achieve without a broad political compromise.
Since the declaration of independence, past experiences have shown that this moment has often become a source of deep political crises. In the absence of a broader agreement among the parties, the process this time could also pose a serious challenge to institutional stability.
Want to support our journalism? Become a member of HIVE or consider making a donation. 