Following the European Parliament (EP) elections in June 2024, EP members (MEPs) elected Ursula von der Leyen from the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) to a second term as European Commission president. Von der Leyen then assigned individual commissioner candidates — one from each EU member — to specific policy areas after consulting with the member states who nominated them. 

These posts range from commissioner for intergenerational fairness, youth, culture and sport, to high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. All nominees for commission posts underwent mandatory hearings in early November 2024, in which MEPs questioned them ahead of confirming them in a single omnibus vote on November 27, 2024.

The process was marked by debate about some of the proposed commissioners’ political backgrounds, particularly with the appointment of Rafaelle Fitto, an Italian member of the extreme-right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), as one of the six executive vice presidents. His appointment sparked confrontation between Von der Leyen’s EPP and the center-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D), as S&D MEPs opposed such a prominent role being assigned to a right-wing figure like Fitto before eventually conceding. Von der Leyen also failed to meet her stated goal of achieving a gender-balanced team.

Two incoming commissioners hold particular significance for the Western Balkans (WB6): high representative for foreign affairs and security policy — a post previously held by Josep Borrell — and commissioner for enlargement, a role filled for the past five years by Olivér Várhelyi. Former Prime Minister of Estonia Kaja Kallas, who also serves as one of the vice presidents of the European Commission, has now taken on the former role, while veteran Slovenian diplomat Marta Kos was confirmed for the latter. 

During her hearing, Kallas identified Russia’s war against Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East as her “urgent priorities,” mentioning EU enlargement in the WB6 and the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue only briefly. Kallas is a strong critic of Russia, a position shaped in part by Estonia’s 20th century history of Soviet subjugation. 

Hence, Kallas is likely to prioritize EU defense against potential Russian aggression, in line with the EU’s broader focus on enhancing EU defense and security in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, neglecting the WB6 risks undermining the region’s EU integration and stability, while also threatening long-term peace prospects in the Balkans.

Where does the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue stand? 

Whoever Kallas names as the new EU special representative (EUSR) for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue will be tasked with engineering a rapidly-needed shift in approach. This is particularly evident given years of stagnation and the dialogue’s current deadlock under Borrell and outgoing EUSR Miroslav Lajčák. 

The dialogue under Borrell and Lajčák has produced few concrete results. Donika Emini, executive director of the CiviKos Platform and member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG), says that the EU has fallen into “a trap of stability operating on crisis prevention mode rather than focus on the real objectives of the dialogue, which would not only normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia but also pave the way for both countries to join the EU.” 

But the dialogue has also failed in crisis management, consistently overlooking underlying issues and avoiding taking a decisive stance on Serbia’s continued destabilizing efforts in Kosovo. This was made especially clear in September 2023, when Serb paramilitary forces breached the border crossing and murdered one Kosovo-Albanian policeman in Banjska, a village in northern Kosovo. 

The EU’s response, when it came, was disappointing albeit unsurprising. It relied on an “all actors” narrative, even after the former vice president of the Serb List political party in Kosovo, Milan Radoičić, admitted his responsibility and involvement in the attack. Though an EU statement referenced a “hideous and cowardly terrorist attack” and the EP passed a joint resolution calling it a “terrorist attack,” the EU’s overall approach did not adapt to reflect the reality that these words would suggest. This approach, coupled with both Kosovo’s and Serbia’s failure to implement agreements, has undermined the dialogue’s credibility, along with that of the EU officials involved, and underscored its overall failure. 

A new EUSR, ideally from a country that recognizes Kosovo’s independence — unlike Borrell (Spain) and Lajčák (Slovakia) — and one committed to enlargement, would be a positive first step towards normalizing relations. Such an EUSR could push both Kosovo and Serbia toward more constructive engagement, using the EU’s leverage on Serbia to adopt a more pragmatic approach, potentially moving from de facto acceptance of Kosovo’s statehood to full recognition — with mutual recognition of sovereignty being the ultimate goal of normalization. 

This should be accompanied by a clear timeline for signing and implementing agreements, with rewards for compliance and consequences for failures. This has not yet happened, as in the case of the 2023 Ohrid Agreement, to which the parties agreed in principle but never formally signed. Yet the extent to which Kallas will prioritize the WB6 remains to be seen, as does her working relationship with Kos, the new enlargement commissioner.

Kos and Kosovo

Kos served as Slovenia’s ambassador to Germany and Latvia from 2013 to 2017 and Switzerland and Liechtenstein between 2017 and 2020. With that diplomatic background, she brings renewed hope for revitalizing the stalled EU enlargement process for the WB6. Moreover, her experience seems to be further bolstered by Slovenia’s historical support for enlargement. 

Florian Bieber, director of the Center for Southeast European Studies (CSEES) at the University of Graz and coordinator of BiEPAG, views having a commissioner from Slovenia as beneficial for the region. 

“I was concerned that the new commissioner for enlargement would be someone who would focus primarily on Ukraine,” Bieber said. “Not that I don’t believe Ukraine should join the EU, but because I was worried that a commissioner from the Baltic states, for example, would have concentrated solely on Ukraine, overlooking the Western Balkans.” 

Bieber added that “the fact that Marta Kos also speaks at least one of the languages of the region allows for a more nuanced understanding, rather than just an outsider’s perspective.”

Marko Kmezić, senior researcher at the CSEES at the University of Graz and also a BiEPAG member, noted that Kos comes from a country without significant internal rule of law or democracy problems — a contrast to her predecessor Várhelyi, a Hungarian. Kos herself emphasized the importance of rule of law, democracy and judicial reforms for candidate countries at her hearing, suggesting that her approach will differ significantly from Várhelyi’s in both tone and direction.

Democracy watchers harshly criticized Várhelyi’s tenure, pointing to his soft stance towards autocrats like President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić and Milorad Dodik, president of the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In one notable instance, Várhelyi echoed Vučić’s talking points about a U.N. resolution condemning the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica, saying he did not “think that stigmatizing the Serbian nation with collective guilt is a viable choice.” Várhelyi also attempted to intervene in EU processes, in one case trying to alter the European Court of Auditors’ critical report on the rule of law program in the region.

Bieber says that Várhelyi sought “to reduce criticism of Serbia’s democracy in that report,” reflecting “a clear bias in his agenda.” It seems, Bieber argues, that Várhelyi “sought not to represent the EU but the Hungarian interests which often align with supporting autocratic regimes.” 

However, Kos’ appointment as enlargement commissioner is not without downsides and challenges. As Slovenia is a small EU member state perceived as enlargement-friendly, Kos may struggle to persuade larger and more enlargement-skeptical EU member states that enlargement is worthy of their attention. 

“While Kos has ambassadorial experience, she is not a senior politician and lacks a strong political network in the EU, which could make it harder for her to assert influence within the EU Commission and the broader European Union,” said Bieber.

“Dubious officials, friends of regional autocrats,” Bieber warns, “may attempt to bypass her by communicating directly with Ursula von der Leyen or negotiating with leaders like France’s Emmanuel Macron, or whoever becomes the next chancellor of Germany.”

EU enlargement in the Western Balkans 

Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election could impact Euro-Atlantic dynamics and the region’s EU aspirations. Trump’s isolationist foreign policy tendencies may trigger the EU to redouble its investment in security, foreign relations and enlargement. But if the EU proves reluctant to take on this commitment, important questions arise for the region: Will the WB6 join the EU, or at least some of its countries, or will it become a gray zone outside the EU, where democratic decline deepens, local populations migrate and Russia and China increase their influence? 

U.S. involvement in the Balkans under a second Trump administration may be limited, forcing the EU to pursue enlargement without robust U.S. backing. Furthermore, based on Trump’s first term and the possible reappointment of someone like Richard Grenell as special presidential envoy for Serbia and Kosovo peace negotiations the U.S. may prioritize bilateral agreements over multilateral efforts involving the EU, and focus on relationships based in economics rather than shared values. An erratic envoy like Grenell could also align favorably more with one side. In such a context, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić would potentially exploit this situation, returning the prospect of a dangerous territorial swap with Kosovo to the negotiating table. 

The land swap idea is dangerous because it would reawaken the idea of division being a better way of solving the problem than cooperation. It would set a precedent that would bolster ethnic nationalism by suggesting that territories should be ethnically homogenized and legitimize territorial claims based on ethnicity in other multiethnic areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Montenegro. Moreover, it would further embolden nationalist leaders, undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, causing further internal destabilization while directly affecting minority rights in both countries. 

Bieber says that “Trump’s presidency could provide some clarity for the EU,” and make expansion in the WB6 a greater priority. “This could resolve the current strategic insecurity and drive the process forward,” he added. “The risk for Trump to mess things up is smaller if the WB6 countries are part of the EU rather than outside of it. While it seems unlikely that all WB6 countries will become EU members during Trump’s presidency, NATO members like Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro could potentially join within the next 4 to 5 years.” 

Researcher and BiEPAG member Lura Pollozhani has a less optimistic view. She suggests that for North Macedonia, the green light for accession seems unlikely in the near future due to both domestic issues and the broader EU’s stance, even if there has been superficial progress.

“From a domestic perspective, there is currently little support for constitutional changes, which are a key element in the EU’s requirements for further integration. The ruling party, which campaigned against any constitutional amendments, views this as part of its mandate, possibly to avoid political controversy,” said Pollozhani. “In this regard, I would expect more of a performative back-and-forth between the two rather than any genuine commitment.” 

North Macedonia’s EU prospects seem especially gloomy after Albania officially opened Cluster 1 with the EU. Cluster 1 is known as the “Fundamentals Cluster” and covers areas considered fundamental to a country’s readiness to advance its accession process such as rule of law, economic criteria, functioning democratic institutions and public administration reform.

The opening of Cluster 1 for Albania was possible because Albania’s accession process decoupled from North Macedonia’s. North Macedonia’s accession was stalled by disputes with Bulgaria about minority rights and constitutional changes, a representation of EU conditionality failure in the region.

“Albania’s progress in EU negotiations was a tough pill for pro-EU voices in North Macedonia to swallow,” said Pollozhani. “It wasn’t that they believed Albania shouldn’t move forward, but rather that it served as a reminder of how North Macedonia had once been ahead in the process, only to lose its lead.”

Albania’s progress in EU integration, particularly with the opening of Cluster 1, occurs in a politically controversial climate. The opening can be viewed as symbolic and unofficially tied to EU conditionality, particularly since it follows last year’s Italy-Albania migration agreement. The EU supported this deal and other EU member states like Germany are also considering similar arrangements with candidate countries like Albania. 

In July 2024, Germany signed an EU lithium deal with Serbia, despite significant environmental protests in Serbia. That deal and the Italy-Albania migration one should not be viewed as separate events. Rather, they seem to be part of a shift in EU foreign policy in the region towards practical bilateral agreements, disregarding previously trumpeted conditionality measures like rule of law, democracy and human rights. 

The EU’s internal instabilities, such as the rise of extreme-right parties in EU member states, further exemplifies these worries. This far-right shift was clearly reflected in the results of the 2024 EP election. In such a context, the WB6’s democratic future and EU accession process are under scrutiny, especially if the EU itself continues to emphasize practical bilateral deals over enlargement conditionality.

Feature Image: K2.0.

Want to support our journalism? Become a member of HIVE or consider making a donation. Learn more here.