Tomorrow will mark the 52nd attempt to constitute the Assembly of Kosovo. So far, this process has failed due to the lack of a majority required in electing the Speaker of the Assembly.

On April 8, in a meeting between representatives of political parties, it was decided to start preparation for the constitutive session on April 15. Vetëvendosje (VV), as the winner of this year’s elections, did not yet have a candidate for Speaker of the Assembly because it lacked the necessary numbers to form a government. After this meeting, Glauk Konjufca, Deputy Chair of VV and Speaker of the Assembly at the time, said: “When we’re talking about government, it is impossible to establish a coalition that has the majority capable of electing a new government with 61 votes; therefore, all positions — I would include the position of Speaker of the Assembly — are subject to this principle. This is probably the reason why we do not have a clear name yet for the future prime minister of the Republic of Kosovo.”

This is a rational statement, a detached assessment of the situation. The numbers were simply not there to suggest otherwise.

Until the day of the first constitutive session, it was not known who VV would propose for Speaker of the Assembly. This was because VV had made no effort to engage in dialogue with other parties in a spirit of cooperation to secure support for its candidate. Therefore, when VV proposed Albulena Haxhiu, the acting Minister of Justice, for the position, she did not receive enough votes.

Konjufca’s initial statement, which had appeared rational and based on a situation where the numbers were lacking, was followed by a shift in VV’s stance towards obstruction. The party refused to change Haxhiu’s candidacy, even though it was clear that other parties would not vote for her. This lack of political will to resolve the deadlock has plunged Kosovo into a prolonged political crisis.

On May 1, in the eighth continuation of the constitutive session, the chair of the session, Avni Dehari from VV — the oldest acting deputy — proposed a secret ballot to form the Committee for Secret Voting for the Election of the Speaker of the Assembly of Kosovo. He justified this proposal by referring to the Constitutional Court’s ruling in case No. KO119/14 of 2014 and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, emphasizing that a secret ballot with physical ballots is the most appropriate way to unblock the process and enable the constitution of the Assembly. The 2014 judgment addresses who can propose a candidate for Speaker of the Assembly and outlines the voting procedures. However, it does not specifically mandate or stipulate that the Speaker must be elected by secret ballot, contrary to Dehari’s argument.

Alleging that Dehari’s proposal was a constitutional violation, deputies of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), supported by several members of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), submitted a request for the assessment of its constitutionality.

On June 26, the Constitutional Court issued Judgment KO124/25, clearly stating that the constitutive session of the Assembly must be concluded within 30 days with the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speakers. According to the judgment, the development and conclusion of the constitutive session must be guided by the constitutional provisions on the constitution of the Assembly, Chapter IV (Constitution of the Assembly) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, and established parliamentary practices to date.

This formulation implies, according to the Court, that the scenario of the first constitutive session — agreed on April 8, 2025, by the former Speaker of the Assembly, Glauk Konjufca, and representatives of political parties — should be implemented. According to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, this scenario includes four steps: the formation of the Temporary Committee for the verification of quorum and mandates, the swearing-in of the deputies, the election of the Speaker, and the election of the Vice-Speakers.

However, the Constitutional Court’s ruling was subject to different interpretations, particularly by political parties — a recurring and problematic practice in Kosovo.

From political discourse to institutional risk

Since June 26*, when the Constitutional Court issued its ruling, VV claimed that the Constitutional Court permitted secret voting, attempting to justify its position on continuing the sessions without a clear time limit, as well as its failure to reach a consensus on the position of the Speaker of the Assembly. Konjufca claimed that the ruling proved there was no legal violation in the proposal for a secret vote. He even stated: “All those who say that Avni Dehari violated the Constitution are poor readers of the Constitutional Court’s ruling.”

In fact, the Constitutional Court did not rule at all on the constitutionality of the proposal for a secret vote, despite the specific request on this matter. This makes Konjufca’s statement entirely incorrect. No one can invoke the Constitutional Court’s ruling to justify an action that it did not review. The ruling does not exclude the possibility that there may be a constitutional violation in the proposal to change the voting process to a secret ballot, because it confirms that the pre-determined scenario of April 8 constitutes the main and sole content of the constitutive session, which the chair of the session must strictly adhere to. This scenario does not allow for a secret ballot.

Arguments based on legal theories and international authorities in the field of constitutional law highlight that the intentional and biased interpretation of judicial decisions violates the separation of powers and undermines the foundations of the rule of law. As Hans Kelsen, the architect of the pure theory of law, emphasized: “The Constitutional Court exists to provide the authoritative interpretation of the Constitution; the absence of such an interpretation cannot be replaced by political or institutional assumptions.” Along the same lines, Bruce Ackerman, professor of constitutional law at Yale University, warns that when institutions begin to base their actions on the silence of the Constitution, rather than on its word and spirit, we enter the territory of arbitrariness, not constitutional governance.

Thus, from a reading of the ruling, it is clear that any procedural decision that does not comply with the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly constitutes a violation of constitutional principles. Consequently, the Constitutional Court’s ruling did not grant legitimacy or legality to a secret ballot not specified in the Rules, nor did it consider such a vote to be a constitutionally permitted form.

This finding is directly related to the principle raised by Jeffrey Goldsworthy, a philosopher and academic in the field of constitutional law and legal philosophy, who emphasizes that constitutional courts must be clear in their decisions, but that the absence of a position on an issue cannot be interpreted as approval for an action.

Even in cases where the constitutions of certain countries stipulate that everything not explicitly prohibited is permitted — as is the case with the constitutions of some of Kosovo’s neighboring countries, such as the Republic of North Macedonia and Montenegro — this principle applies to areas governed by ordinary legislation, not constitutional matters. Otherwise, it would represent a violation of the constitutional order and expose the system to the dangers posed by arbitrary interpretations of constitutional norms. This is precisely what Goldsworthy warns against when he states that such distorted interpretations are dangerous because they conflate silence with consent and, consequently, lead the system toward institutional arbitrariness.

As Alexy argues, the correct interpretation of constitutional norms requires that judicial decisions be read not only as legal texts but as “acts of public reason,” constructed through a balance of principles and rules, with the aim of preserving the coherence of the legal system. It is, therefore, inaccurate and conceptually flawed to label those who analyze decisions based on legal reasoning, rather than political interests, as “poor readers,” as Konjufca claims.

Konjufca’s statement is more than just ordinary political commentary. It represents a dangerous interpretation of how politics can deliberately distort the meaning and authority of constitutional jurisprudence, using it as a tool for internal party goals or to justify contradictory institutional actions. Instead of respecting constitutional principles, Konjufca resorted to broad accusations against anyone who interpreted the ruling differently, particularly those whose interpretation diverged from his and that of the party he represents.

Institutional responsibility over political interests

One of the basic pillars of the constitutional order is respect for the separation of powers, including the obligation that each ruling of the Constitutional Court be read and interpreted with prudence and objectivity, and executed with immediate effect, especially by those leading the institutions.

The Constitutional Court speaks through its rulings, and these should be read not according to party interests, but according to the standards of constitutional law. In the case of the constitutive session, as discussed above, this standard has been established through parliamentary practice — a democratic, transparent, and accountable standard. It is regrettable that the former Speaker of the Assembly, who is also the Deputy Speaker of the ruling party and the outgoing government, fails to distinguish between his institutional responsibility — upholding the Constitution and parliamentary rules — and his political convictions as Deputy Speaker of the ruling party.

This mix of functions undermines public trust in the constitutional functioning of the state and creates uncertainty in public opinion about the basic rules of parliamentary democracy. The interpretation of a constitutional decision should be based on the internal reasoning of the decision, the normative context, and the institutional structure of the constitutional system — not on the interests of daily politics. This highlights the danger posed when political figures attempt to invent interpretations outside legal logic to defend their political positions.

In conclusion, the Constitutional Court’s ruling is a clear message emphasizing the need to respect constitutional rules in the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions and a warning against any attempt to politically instrumentalize constitutional institutions. Rather than being used to discredit critical voices, this ruling should serve as a guide for dialogue and mutual institutional respect — in defense of democracy and the rule of law in Kosovo.

The responsibility of legal professionals and an informed public is to resist such manipulation, thereby protecting the integrity of the constitutional order and trust in the institutions of justice. Politicizing judicial decisions risks transforming the judiciary into a tool of the executive or legislative power, compromising its independence and its credibility as the guardian of the Constitution.

Feature image: Ferdi Limani / K2.0.

*Editor’s note: In an earlier version of this article, the date of the Constitutional Court’s decision was incorrectly listed as June 27. The article now reflects the correct date: June 26.

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