The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue has vigorously resumed. Along with it, the complexities and uncertainties that accompany it have reappeared. 

The parties involved have quickly reaffirmed their opposition to a technical process, the model that has been used in the past. This means that instead of reaching individual agreements on specific points, negotiations can only end with a “grand” agreement that addresses a range of issues.

What is left unsaid, however, is that the approach of the facilitator, the EU, will remain the same — the “European method,” which is based on the original philosophy of the European Coal and Steel Community. The goal of this paradigm is to build trust between parties through discussion of technical issues and then gradually move toward more sensitive topics  over the course of the negotiation process. 

This “incremental approach,” which was used to reach agreements between 2011 and 2015, is still being used today; the difference is that it is now necessary for the parties to agree on all issues at the same time in order for them to reach an agreement. 

Kosovo and Serbia began discussions with topics that were considered less controversial, such as the issue of missing persons for the former and that of displaced persons for the latter. Following the results achieved on these topics, as reported by EU officials, they are now moving on to more complex issues, including property and financial rights, as well as the rights of minority communities.

The technical approach proved successful in the case of post-World War II Europe, as guilty parties took responsibility for crimes, apologies were tendered and entire generations unanimously condemned criminals. In the case of Kosovo and Serbia, however, it seems that this method is resulting in numerous setbacks. What was achieved after World War II was never achieved after any of the wars of the former Yugoslavia, let alone in the case of the Kosovo War in particular.

With this underlying reality, the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue has entered its final phase, and a comprehensive agreement is being sought through the facilitation of the new EU special envoy, Miroslav Lajčák.

Lajčák received his mandate with the full support of not only the Council of the EU that appointed him, but also Germany and France, which made sure during this year’s virtual Paris Summit to convey to the parties involved that EU member states support the envoy in this process. Lajčák needed this support, as the Kosovo authorities did not readily easily accept his appointment to the post, given his past as the foreign minister of Slovakia — a state that does not recognize Kosovo — and the fact that he had voted against Kosovo’s membership in UNESCO.

Returning to dissonance

Lajčák’s apparent zeal to push negotiations forward, following statements that there was already agreement between the parties on the framework of the process and its elements, created a misleading impression. Although the process cannot be expected to move forward without setbacks, in the current situation it seems that the difficulties go beyond these. The necessary readiness of the parties to move toward the “grand finale” is obviously lacking, despite their statements saying otherwise.

On the Kosovo side, there is a marked lack of internal political unity around this process and the position that Kosovo should have in it. The current government, led by Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti’s LDK party, does not have the majority needed to push the process forward, and it lacks legitimacy.

On the Serbian side, President Aleksandar Vučić and his authoritarian regime remain mired in the mentality of the Slobodan Milošević era, during which Vučić served as minister of information. This mindset is camouflaged just enough to be acceptable to the EU. He is not interested in a quick deal without being sure he will get what he wants “in return.”

Meanwhile, relations between the two parties remain distant and strained. This was evidenced by statements made last weekend by Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin, who consistently used derogatory terms against Kosovar Albanians and went so far as to insist on his “right” to do so. Similarly, Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić recently expressed concern for the “stupid” Serbs who show Albanians the location of mass graves of victims of the regime in which he himself served as spokesman.

All this occurred just weeks after the EU had declared that the parties had succeeded in addressing the initial topics, including the issue of missing persons.

Lajčák’s zeal can be likened to that of United States Ambassador Richard Grenell, but he lacks Grennell’s political power. However, in this context even the White House proved limited in its willingness to push the parties toward a final settlement, as it opted instead for “economic normalization.” Lajčák’s political power operates within the limits of the special envoy, who can promise the parties nothing more than the provision of an EU goodwill roundtable, but which nevertheless also carries the promise of a European perspective.

This is the real carrot that the EU has at its disposal to push the process toward a final agreement. In the absence of a real European perspective for Kosovo, which five member states still do not recognize, the EU has only visa liberalization as a bargaining chip. This carrot — which has been offered for a long time already — will be insufficient to bring Kosovo to the table for the big agreement.

On the other hand, Serbia is still far from meeting the criteria for EU membership; it has not yet opened all the chapters of the EU acquis, meaning the soonest it could become a member is 2025. Until then, its interest in reaching an agreement with Kosovo is lukewarm, and it is working to sway the process more and more to its advantage.

New stage, old problems

Besides these challenges, the perpetuation of problems from earlier stages may hinder the progress of the current stage of dialogue.

With Lajčák at the helm, normalization remains a term with multiple interpretations, open to suit the preferences of each party, and what comes after the process remains uncertain. In closed-door meetings, EU representatives — including those at the highest levels — admit that there will be talk of recognition of Kosovo by Serbia and that this is the goal, but this has never been articulated publicly. Serbia does not publicly acknowledge this either.

The lack of transparency remains a key feature of the process, meaning very little is still known about it, other than those elements mentioned by Lajčák. 

The process is unfortunately also lacking in sincerity from all parties involved. Implementation of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities Agreement is one of those issues that highlights this element.

Kosovo agreed to talk about the rights of minority communities when negotiations were being led by President Thaçi; this is made clear by the January 2019 document his office shared with  the state delegation at the time. 

However, it is still unclear whether Prime Minister Hoti has agreed to discuss the issue in Brussels, despite the fact that the Principles of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities, drafted in 2015, stipulates that the statute of the Association drafted by the Management Team will be presented in the high-level dialogue.

For Serbia’s part, its statements about wanting to see the implementation of the agreements reached in 2013 and 2015, which outlined the competencies of the Association, are disingenuous. 

In the 2015 agreement, Points 2 and 21 reference the role of Kosovo’s Constitutional Court in interpreting a foreseen governmental decree on the Association, stating, “The Government of Kosovo will adopt a directly applicable decree, which will be reviewed by the Constitutional Court” and “The statute will be confirmed by decree.”

But Serbia does not really even seek implementation of the (less specific) 2013 Agreement, because ultimately it would not satisfy their designs on Kosovo, which range from the demand for the autonomy of Serb-majority municipalities to territorial ambitions.

On the other hand, the EU says that it is up to Kosovo to propose how to form the Association and implement the agreements it has reached to show itself as a serious and credible party in the process. The real goal is not the implementation of the agreement, but its renegotiation. 

Lajčák knows that the agreement negotiated by the EU itself has left room for different interpretations. He also knows that the version based on the Constitutional Court ruling does not suit Serbia and that arrangements for the Serb community in Kosovo could be the key to reaching a final agreement.

While challenges will remain numerous and the process can be expected to be lengthy, avoiding problems from the past should serve as an initial guide as the dialogue progresses toward a final agreement.

Feature image from Miroslav Lajčák’s Twitter account.