The Constitutional Court ruling that paved the way for the LDK party’s government formation by deciding in favor of President Hashim Thaçi’s decree to pass the mandate to whoever managed to form a simple majority, has set a very dangerous precedent. It will potentially have a detrimental impact on the future of the democratic transformation of the country by endorsing a vicious cycle of state capture by corrupt political elites.
The political implications of the latest power shuffle are manifold. While the current government claims that it prevented the country from plunging into a deeper crisis, the developments around it have put into jeopardy twenty years of political reforms and efforts to install democracy in Kosovo.
On paper, Kosovo looks like a democracy but the dysfunctional and state-captured institutions are an immense obstacle in building a consolidated democratic system. This has been best reflected in the latest political power shuffle initiated by the second largest party in parliament, LDK, and President Thaçi who politically backed the process to further strengthen his position in foreign policy and the dialogue with Serbia.
There is a growing tendency, by regional analysts, to view Kosovo as a country facing a democratic backslide; this is a trend that has been recognized throughout the Western Balkan region. However, the term backslide implies that the country was a consolidated democracy at a certain point — which is not the case with Kosovo. Instead, Kosovo is stuck in a hybrid status quo that shows authoritarian tendencies on the path to democracy.
Will elections become redundant?
Free and fair elections have been viewed by V-Dem and Freedom House as the key indicator in measuring the quality of democracy globally. The free elections represented one of the main elements that — to some extent — qualified Kosovo as a fragile democracy in the making.
The October elections were considered well-administered, free and transparent by international observers. The process showed signs of the growing democratic maturity of Kosovar voters. From the regional perspective, the change in power was considered a major step in the fight against state capture.
After the success story in North Macedonia, the elections in Kosovo and the opposition’s win were expected by many regional experts to have an impact and a domino effect throughout the entire region.
However, the extreme political maneuvers by the political elite to topple the government in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic — while blatantly utilizing the foreign strategic partners for domestic consumption — led to increase of desperation and despair. The notorious multidimensional political events leading to an unprecedented institutional and constitutional crisis, washed away the hope sparked after the opposition’s electoral victory on October 6.
If the government can be formed by marginalizing the winner of the elections, with the second place party worming its way to power by barely making 61 (a majority by one) votes in the parliament, establishing a minority government through the support and the explicit influence of the President over the members of the parliament, will it make the election process redundant?
This has been the boiling question for each and every citizen while they calculate the next steps while projecting for — at least another decade — of state capture. This precedent almost makes the election process irrelevant in the near future.
The Constitutional Court ruling paved the way to marginalize Vetëvendosje, unless it wins 51% of votes — which looks unlikely right now. So this situation can continue for some time. This is mainly due to the fact that the political parties allegedly most responsible for state capture will push themselves to overcome their hostilities and join their forces to retain their power at all cost.
Passing the mandate to the second place party can easily become a source of political instability, increasing the risk of serious state-capture of one of the key institutions in Kosovo, the Parliament. This has been confirmed by one of the MPs who reportedly has been persuaded to change his vote personally by President Thaçi and former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj.
Should this trend of influence over members of the parliament continue, the tendency to change the government to fit the “bigger political agendas’’ will become inevitable.
The Trust Decline Curve
Just before the vote for the Avdullah Hoti-led Government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kosovo launched their traditional Public Pulse report,an opinion survey of Kosovo citizens about trust toward public institutions. Since 2014, when Kosovo entered the vicious cycle of political crisis, the level of public trust toward state institutions has been in free fall. The reports published by Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and the Kosovo Security Barometer, show a sharp decline in trust toward public institutions further confirming the findings of the UNDP report.
However, the latest report showed high approval levels for Vjosa Osmani and Albin Kurti. While there was a tendency to question the results — especially by LDK leader, Isa Mustafa. It surely reflects a general political support for the Osmani-Kurti duo.
It is too early to say whether the Hoti Government will attain these approval levels. Particularly because of the debates over its legitimacy. In addition to that question, the country will be facing one of the biggest economic crises caused by the extreme lockdown for almost three months.
The government of the dialogue but not of internal reforms
The LDK led government has been formed with the aim of concluding the Dialogue with Serbia. The first decisions that the new government has undertaken are to pave the way for the parties to go back to the negotiating table — a US led process that is excluding the EU.
Giving up reciprocity and gradually placing this process in the hands of the President Thaçi are the first two signs sent to Special Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell and President Aleksandar Vučić indicating that we are ready, now the ball is in your court.
There are few expectations for this government to fight state capture or have a reformist agenda. The first reason behind this perception is that the government was composed at the last minute with no long term strategic orientation. Secondly, the Hoti Government includes political parties that have been allegedly linked to different elements of state capture, corruption and organized crime.
The hopes that this government will continue the reforms initiated in the past are nonexistent. Deep rule of law reforms require a very solid government with political will to fight state capture. For the Hoti Government the reformist agenda is almost mission impossible.
Economic Crisis, Social Unrest and Instability
The COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown have seriously harmed the — already fragile — economy of Kosovo. The impact of the pandemic in the economy is still unknown as the country has lifted all the measures in the past three days.
The Hoti Government will be dealing with an unprecedented economic crisis and the inability to succeed in this regard may seriously harm its future. The expectations in this regard are rather high given the reputation of the LDK as the party of technocrats, academics and economists ready to help bring back the country economically.
Economic crises often trigger social unrest. Paired with political instability, the economic crisis could exacerbate many other problems.
Following the global trend of protests, massive demonstrations and angry crowds rebelling after having their basic rights stripped away by the governments, Kosovo might face a massive wave of protests.
The Critical Juncture
Kosovo has had three governments over the first half of the year. A political crisis followed by economic instability can be detrimental for the future of the country. On the other hand, the lack of political unity in relation to the Dialogue with Serbia might deepen political and societal polarization.
It is imperative to reach an agreement that is acceptable and implementable, that is a result of an inclusive process deriving from a bottom-up approach.
The pandemic has already reshaped democracy and governance in Kosovo. But the real impact is still yet to be seen. However, as we try to get our lives back and return to normal, we should try to build a better “normal” instead.
The good news is that, based on the reactions toward the latest political developments, there are large sections of citizenry who are willing to stand up against authoritarian tendencies.
Feature image: Arnaud Jaegers.
